Daily Report

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FBIS-EEU-93-221 *18 November 1993*

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UN Tribunal on War Crimes Opens

LD1711224693 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1918 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Brussels, Nov 17 (TANJUG)—The U.N. tribunal for war crimes committed in the territory of ex-Yugoslavia since 1991 held its inaugural session in The Hague on Wednesday.

The tribunal, set up under U.N. Security Council resolution 827 as the first such forum since the end of World War Two, will have the power to start proceedings against persons suspected of violating the Geneva conventions and committing crimes against humanity and crimes of genocide.

Addressing the inaugural session which was largely formal in nature, U.N. Under Secretary General for Legal Affairs Carl August Fleischhauer read a statement on behalf of U.N. Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali, after which the 11 judges were sworn in. The current chairman of the Security Council, Ambassador Jose Luis Jesus of Cape Verde, and Dutch Foreign Minister Pieter Kooijmans also addressed the forum.

Fleischhauer said the tribunal would prosecute individuals for war crimes and establish the responsibility of not only those who had committed the crimes, but also those who had taken part in their planning and preparation.

The tribunal has undertaken to honour international law, and has recourse to Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter in order to force the competent bodies to cooperate. It is superior to the national courts which practically strips the national courts of their authority.

The 11 judges appointed by the General Assembly for a period of four years include jurors from Nigeria, Pakistan, Costa Rica, the United States, Canada, Italy, Egypt, China, France, Malaysia and Australia.

The prosecutor, Venezuelan Attorney General Ramon Escovar Salom, has the power to open investigations and bring indictments against perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity. During the first session, the judges will elect a president and draft the tribunal's rules of procedure. No cases will be discussed on the first day.

The inauguration ceremony was held in the Japanese room of the Peace Palace in The Hague, which features as its prize piece of furniture a priceless chair donated to the palace many years ago by Yugoslavia.

The pomp and circumstance attending the grand opening have, however, failed to disperse doubts as to the purpose, motives, aims and legitimity of the tribunal. The critics of its setting up say that an identical forum already exists in The Hague (the International Court of Justice) and that the Security Council, as a body of the General Assembly, has had no right to set up a new one.

They also wonder why the new tribunal has set out to [words indistinct] such an important matter as only individual responsibility [words indistinct] collective responsibility for the dissolution of the internationally recognized state of Yugoslavia. Another question is why the U.N. has set up only a tribunal for former Yugoslavia and not for other war-stricken areas in the world, and on what grounds it claims the right to interfere in the sovereignty of a state and its legal system.

All this bodes ill for the institution which has set itself up as a supra-national arbiter.

Albania's Kopliku Addresses G-24 Meeting

AU1811080293 Tirana ATA in English 1122 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Tirana, November 17 (ATA)—G-24 summit meeting on Albania opened on November 16 in Brussels. An Albanian Government delegation, headed by the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, Bashkim Kopliku, who is charged with the economic reform, took part in the summit.

Messages of President Berisha and the EC deputy president, Leon Brittan, addressed to the summit, were read at the beginning.

On behalf of the Albanian Government, Mr. Kopliku spoke of the achievements in the political and economic reform in Albania. Mr. Kopliku said that reform in politics has been more progressive than in economy. Albania is consistently restructuring democratic institutions and applying the law on equal bases for all, irrespective of political affiliation. The economic reform has been much more successful than envisaged by the international organisations such as the World Bank and IMF. Actually Albania needs assistance in public investment, infrastructure, health and education leaving investments in production such as agriculture and industry, as well as tourism and public services to the private sector and mainly to foreign investments.

Representatives of EC, IMF, World Bank, Italy, Greece, the U.S.A., Germany, France, Britain, Austria, Japan, Switzerland, Netherlands, and Sweden discussed Albania's successes in the economic reform. The U.S. delegation underlined the significant role democratic Albania, led by President Berisha, has played in stabilizing the tense situation in the region.

Discussions in this session mainly concentrated on the contribution of the G-24 states to the balance of payments.

On November 17 the meeting will discuss investments in transport, agriculture, health, education and privatization.

Germany's Schmidtbauer Meets With Berisha

AU1711174593 Tirana ATA in English 0914 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Tirana, November 17 (ATA)—In his meeting with the state minister of Germany, Schmidtbauer, the Albanian president, Sali Berisha, said that the relations and friendship with Germany are a priority of the Albanian foreign policy and that Albania will try to expand them on the bilateral plane. "We would like Germany to support Albania's integration in European institutions and to influence in a correct solution to the crisis in the region," Mr. Berisha said, adding that Albania considers important that Germany should have a permanent place in the UN Security Council and evaluates the role of the German factor in Europe. The Albanian president appreciated the efforts of Chancellor Kohl in support of European values and principles.

Minister Schmidtbauer said that he had come as a friend of Albania and assured the president of the sentiments of sympathy existing in Germany for the Albanians. "We are ready, like in the past, to help you concretely," Mr. Schmidtbauer said. He also conveyed the greetings of Chancellor Kohl and the invitation extended to President Berisha for a visit to Germany.

Discusses Relations With Meski

AU1711174693 Tirana ATA in English 0916 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Tirana, November 17 (ATA)—Premier Meksi met on November 16 with the state minister of Germany, Mr. Shmidtbauer. They talked with about bilateral relations and promotion of the cooperation between Albania and Germany.

Mr. Meksi stressed that relations between Albania and Germany may be closer and expanded in all fields. "We would like a greater participation of German investing firms in the Albanian tourism, infrastructure, chrome industry, and other fields," Mr. Meksi said. After appreciating the successes of the democratic government, Mr. Scmidtbauer assured Mr. Meksi that the German Government will have a continuous interest in Albania.

Meksi Departs for Bulgaria on Two-Day Visit

AU1711204093 Tirana ATA in English 1901 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Tirana, November 17 (ATA)—Albanian Premier Aleksander Meksi left on a two-day visit to Sofia November 17 invited by his Bulgarian counterpart, Berov.

During his visit Premier Meksi plans to meet with Bulgarian president, speaker of the parliament, prime minister, and other senior officials.

Berisha, Rugova Discuss Serbs' Action

AU1811105493 Tirana ATA in English 0918 GMT 18 Nov 93

[Text] Tirana, Nov 18 (ATA)—On November 17 after noon, the president of the Republic of Albania, Sali Berisha, met with the president of the Republic of Kosova, Ibrahim Rugova. They discussed the situation and the latest political developments in the region as well as the development of the reform in Albania.

Mr. Berisha and Mr. Rugova said that, reacting against constant efforts to solve problems of the Albanians in Kosova and former Yugoslavia through a democratic and peaceful way, Belgrade is launching a fresh and combined campaign to intensify police actions and plots, through which it seeks to find fault with the Albanians and their policy. Police actions and plots include engagement in the socalled dialogue with discredited and pro-Serb elements, who enjoy no support in Kosova or Albania as well as the unfolding of old scenarios carefully organised by the Yugoslav Army secret service and its collaborators who have penetrated in Albania, and several Albanian political forces in Macedonia.

The two presidents said that, under the existing situation, it is indispensable that the Albanians, as always, adhere to the principles of solving such situations peacefully. They insisted that the Albanians in Macedonia, should, also in the future, contribute to stability without giving up their just demands. They considered the dialogue of the real and legitimate representatives of the Kosovar people with the representatives of the Serbian party, and in the presence of the representatives of a third party, of the Geneva conference, as an important element to solve the Kosova problem.

Both presidents considered the invitation extended to Rugova by Paris, Bonn and London, as very important and serious, hoping that this dialogue will contribute to the wide and proper treatment of the Albanian question. They said that any attempt to lift or lighten embargo on Serbia, directly or indirectly incites Serbia's aggression. The lifting of the embargo on Serbia must be conditioned by the resolution of the Kosova question and the reduction of Serbian military potential at levels allowed by the CSCE. They also expressed the desire of the Greek government, also of Albania, to overcome difficulties and build up a climate of cooperation and dialogue between Albania and Greece, which was made known during the visit of the Greek foreign minister, Papoulias, last week in Tirana.

Slovak President, Havel Discuss Foreign Policy

AU1811062193 Prague CTK in English 1002 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Prague, Nov 17 (CTK)—Slovak President Michal Kovac arrived in Prague today on a one-day working visit to the Czech Republic. Talks between Kovac and Czech President Vaclav Havel will be held at the presidential chateau in Lany, central Bohemia. Kovac is to depart for Bratislava at 4:00 p.m. [1500 GMT) today.

Kovac told journalists in Lany before his meeting with Havel that coordination of the two countries' foreign policies and problems connected with their joining European structures would be discussed at today's talks.

The two presidents confirmed to journalists that it was not a coincidence that November 17 had been chosen as the date for their meeting. November 17 is a day that united our peoples and countries, Havel said. Kovac added that this date was the recollection of common actions which took place on November 17, 1989, both in Prague and Bratislava. He said at that time he kept his fingers crossed for citizen Havel and that he was glad to meet with Havel as presidents of two friendly countries on the date of the anniversary of the revolution.

Havel noted that he would like to know from Kovac how he implements his position of a constitutional official in his specific political activities.

Referring to Slovakia's relationship with Germany, Kovac stressed that it was out of the question for Slovakia to abolish so-called Benes decrees. He said he was interested in coordinating actions with the Czech Republic on this issue.

Under the 1945 decrees of then Czechoslovak President Edvard Benes, Germans, Hungarians, and other enemies of the Czech and Slovak peoples were expelled from Czechoslovakia and their property was confiscated by the state.

News Conference Reported

LD1711165493 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1500 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] The concluding news conference given by the Czech and Slovak presidents ended in Lany an hour ago. Marika Taborska reports.

[Taborska] According to [Czech President] Vaclav Havel, both presidents have agreed today that these meetings, currently being organized three times a year, were useful and proved to be worthwhile. This time the meeting took place on 17 November to underline one of the moments that join the two nations and countries, namely the joint action against the totalitarian regime.

The main topic of today's talks were issues related to the coordination of the two republics' efforts to get integrated into West European political, economic, and security structures.

Vaclav Havel and [Slovak President] Michal Kovac dealt in detail with the American project called "Partnership for Peace." They agreed that this project could become the first step to our full membership in the NATO.

The two presidents also talked about how to make the life of Czechs in Slovakia easier and vice-versa. One of the results of the talks is the agreement that the two president would jointly propose the reciprocal abolition of administrative fees that are being paid for a long-term stay on the territory of the other republic.

Agreement on Bilateral Issues Noted

AU1711185193 Prague CTK in English 1657 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Lany, central Bohemia, Nov 17 (CTK)— Czech President Vaclav Havel and his Slovak counterpart Michal Kovac told journalists that at their meeting today they agreed to try to remove all obstacles which make Czech citizens foreigners in Slovakia and vice versa.

Kovac is on a one-day working visit to the Czech Republic.

The two presidents said that these efforts would be largely aimed at the reciprocal abolition of all fees for the acquiring of state citizenship and other fees burdening the citizens of the partner republic. However, the definitive settlement of the question will be a matter for the executive bodies, above all for the Finance and Interior Ministries, Havel said.

He and Kovac also confirmed the coordination of their countries' approach to relations with Germany and of their standpoints on the compensation of victims of fascism. In this connection, Kovac said that abolition of the Benes decrees (under which 2.9 million Sudeten Germans and 30,000 Hungarians were expelled from Czechoslovakia in 1945 and their property was confiscated) was out of the question.

Havel said that the topics he discussed with Kovac included the Czech-Slovak border and the division of the former federal property.

Kovac said he was worried that Czech-Slovak cultural and intellectual relations were declining, and therefore one of his next meetings with Havel would focus on this problem. The ministers of culture and education would probably be invited to the meeting, Havel said.

He said that he had also discussed with Kovac the establishment of a chair of Czech and Slovak Studies at Harvard University in the USA.

Kovac expressed his fears of the mass migration of Romany communities between the Czech and Slovak Republics. The two presidents agreed that the governments of their countries would not support such migration.

Havel on 'Partnership for Peace'

LD1711214393 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1700 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Excerpt] The integration of the Czech Republic and Slovakia in western structures was the dominant topic of talks between Presidents Michal Kovac and Vaclav Havel. Commenting on the U.S. project Partnership for Peace, President Havel said:

[Begin Havel recording] We agreed that this might be a good beginning of a gradual transformation of the North Atlantic alliance into a European defense alliance. Naturally, the important thing is what content this project will gradually be given. The other thing which matters, of course, is the question of different approach toward different countries. [passage indistinct]

For certain countries, their turn should come probably earlier—because of their level of civilization and culture and the degree of their democracy as well as their geopolitical position—than for other countries with, let us say, a considerably looser tie to the sphere of civilization whose defense is the North Atlantic alliance's task.

We also discussed the possibility of individual Partnership for Peace agreements having a different content, a different emphasis for different countries, containing individual prospects for every single country—prospects which again might be different in individual cases. [passage indistinct]

It is not possible to exclude the possibility that the Partnership for Peace project will in a way aim at and grow into a status which might be understood as an associate status. Naturally, the pace of the process of a further rapprochement toward NATO depends above all on us, on the stability of our political and economic system, on the compatibility of our armies. However, it also depends on NATO's will.

In our view, it is necessary to continue an enlightenment campaign in which we will stress again and again that in the new European situation, expansion is in the interest of the alliance and its current members. We have to stress again and again that permanent peace and security can hardly be achieved in Europe as a whole unless they are guaranteed in Central Europe. It would not be appropriate to have some substantially different and higher criteria imposed on us. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Visegrad Group Discussed

AU1711204893 Prague CTK in English 1839 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Lany, central Bohemia, Nov 17 (CTK)— At his meeting today with his Czech counterpart Vaclav Havel, Slovak President Michal Kovac told journalists he would support the coordination of steps made by the Visegrad Four (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia) in their striving to integrate into NATO.

However, Havel said that there existed a danger of the newly democratic countries being perceived as a whole without differentiation between individual states. However, this does not mean that the Visegrad Group has no permanent meaning, Havel added.

Kovac is on a one-day working visit to the Czech Republic.

Kovac said that the Visegrad countries would welcome a further step to be made in the integration process, which would give them greater commitments from NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) regarding their security. A certain form of associate membership could be such a step, Kovac said.

Havel said he believed that the U.S. Partnership for Peace project might be a good starting point for the Visegrad countries' gradual integration into NATO and NATO's possible transformation into an European defense alliance. However, a differentiated approach to the individual countries is important, Havel stressed.

Kovac said he had joined the declaration made recently by Havel and Slovenian President Milan Kucan on peace negotiations in the former Yugoslavia. These negotiations reflected the effort being made to reach a truce, but might end up by allowing the country's ethnic division, which would not ensure permanent peace, Kovac said.

Official, Minister Debate Reform in Army

AU1711160193 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 16 Nov 93 p 9

[Unattributed report containing statement by Tomas Fejfar, deputy chairman of the Parliament Defense and Security Committee, and statement by Czech Defense Minister Antonin Baudys: "Polemics on the State of the Army of the Czech Republic"]

[Text] There has been a stormy debate about the shape of the post-November federal army. Some experts claim that the maximum possible changes have been implemented—after all, just the transfer of the divisions and units from the militarily overstocked Czech Republic to insufficiently armed Slovakia and the division of the army following the partition of the federation allegedly represented a singular achievement. Hence, it is difficult to say how useful today are the discussions about whether or not it would have been possible to do more to transform the army colossus into an action-ready, while economic, mechanism.

Nevertheless, the debate continues—although it no longer applies to the Czechoslovak Army but rather to the Czech Army. Allegedly, not much has changed in the Czech Army, or at least what has been done is a long way from what might have been done. The polemics are in a way characterized by the following two views—the first

by a parliament deputy, Tomas Fejfar, deputy chairman of the Parliament Defense and Security Committee, and the second by Defense Minister Antonin Baudys.

The Armed Forces Are Still in Year One

[Fejfar] The Army of the Czech Republic finds itself in year one, not only because the state broke up or because a new army concept is being implemented, but also because nothing changed there in the three years following the revolution. Excuse me, something did change: The comrades have fortified their positions.

In December 1989, the comrades in the top echelons of the Defense Ministry met several times to discuss what to do next. Those in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Central Committee did not allow them to clear the streets with tanks as they had originally planned. So, what should they do with the army, and especially with themselves? They agreed that it was imperative to maintain the party organizations, and if that failed, an Association of Professional Soldiers had to be established. The academy for political instructors would most likely have to be renamed, and the political instructors would have to focus on social management. Military counterespionage would have to be quickly transferred to army control and dispersed into the defense intelligence, military police, or the ministry inspection. Who knows how State Security would end up. A few comrades generals of retirement age would have to be dismissed to calm down the plebs. They acted accordingly.

Some unplanned losses also occurred—the beloved Minister Vacek fell and with him several other supporting pillars. The wounds healed, however, the new minister was pacified, and the former fellows were taken care of—after all, there was enough military property to go around.

The new leadership at the Defense Ministry faced several difficult tasks at the beginning of this year: To spoil the so far smoothly proceeding plans of the ex-comrades, to complete and implement the new concept for building the Czech Army, and gradually prepare the army and the republic to join NATO.

Figuring out how to join the Alliance will be a challenging problem. It will be very difficult with the ex-comrades firmly ensconced in all kinds of positions. Their passive resistance literally pacifies the army, and those among them who are working for the KGB or GRU [Russian Main Intelligence Directorate] certainly will not arouse sympathies amony our future partners.

Minister Baudys decided to deal with the situation by carrying out an extraordinary review of professional soldiers. It has transpired, however, that the power of the adversary is far too great: Everyone has something on someone else, and after all, "there is honor among thieves." Our committee gently pointed this out to the minister, and later I did the same somewhat less delicately. There was no response, however, if I do not count the fact that the minister terminated the reviews only to resume them 24 hours later.

To prevent any misunderstanding, it would be impossible for all former communists to leave the army, as then there would be no one left. I am satisfied with the appointments to the top posts at the ministry, for instance, in the General Staff, and Defense Intelligence. Reasonable doubts exist, however, regarding the appointments to lower ranking posts. What can I do about it, if I cannot get an audience despite passing on specific comments regarding certain officers to the minister? I am not surprised that able officers—harassed by those newly screened—are leaving, having lost all their illusions about the army.

In this year one, this and nothing else is the biggest problem of the Czech Army.

I Inherited a Pre-November Ministry

[Baudys] The statement by Deputy Fejfar that the army is in year one is correct. His supposition that nothing has changed there since my arrival, however, is wrong. Although my predecessors significantly reduced the army, they did not take a single step that would benefit its structure, personnel, logistics, educational and training process, or even military medical care. Simply, I inherited it in its pre-November state.

It was only the Czech Defense Ministry, when established, that decided on a fundamental transformation of all army spheres. We began with the most irksome problem—personnel. By the way, the oft discussed extraordinary review is an opportunity to cleanse the army of as many discredited people as possible. I have repeatedly said that if we are 30 percent successful, we can congratulate ourselves. There is no solution that would make it possible to carry out the required personnel changes within one year—the reduction of the army would be more than we could tolerate.

Of course, some political instructors serve in the army. Most of them do. I am not ecstatic about it, but if I dismiss them all, I will not have platoon and company commanders—i.e., there will be no supervisory staff for basic training. Although the Czech Army is full of high-ranking officers, it is short of non-commissioned officers, sergeants, corporals, and privates. We are going to deal with this disadvantageous structure now, and we already have some ideas about how to do it. It is impossible to dismiss 10,000 people we do not need from one day to the next. The army positions are filled only to between 50 and 70 percent of the necessary strength of professional soldiers. All these are reasons that I am not able to begin reducing as I would like.

Thanks to the extraordinary reviews, however, it was possible to place at the head of the General Staff people who belong there. They are now surrounding themselves with quality experts who will eventually do the same. Of course, I have received dozens of letters and warnings about the lamentable standard of the extraordinary

review. It is also true that people have survived in the army who have no place there. This applies, for instance, to Command West in Tabor. So far, I can only say that most of the officials of this command will soon be leaving the army. Only the West commander, General Jura will remain.

As opposed to Deputy Fejfar, I do not believe that all the able officers are leaving the army because of discredited superiors. Many of those leaving are qualified experts, and will be better paid in the private sector. That actually applies to the entire state administration.

Nevertheless, there are several places in the army that form something like centers of resistance to change. This concerns the inner ideological opposition of these people who endeavor to create an environment hostile to everything new.

I would like to take this opportunity to point out that the minister is responsible for his department, and the army has a very complex mechanism. A deputy certainly does not have this responsibility. He points out the shortcomings, and I have to deal with them. The changes cannot always be achieved as quickly and easily as we would like.

We have discussed several times with Mr. Fejfar and Vladimir Suman, Defense and Security Committee chairman, our difficulties with mutual communication. The door to my office is always open to them. Several times we have prepared a program for the deputies to acquaint them in more detail with the problems the army faces—only a few have taken advantage of this opportunity.

It should also be mentioned that the theft of army property has been stopped; of course I am not referring to criminal offenses. The most disadvantageous contracts (whether lease, or exclusive representation....) signed by my predecessors are another matter altogether. I cannot do a thing about this heritage.

Beside the shortcomings of the Czech Army, one should also take into account the high credit given to the Czech troops in Croatia. Their work also reflects the standard of the army. Moreover, it is not generally known that in comparison with some Western armies, the training of our soldiers is of superb quality. We should be aware of this, too.

Since the Czech Army came into being, we have done a lot of work on its concept, personnel issues, logistics, military education and medical care. Were are the only sector in this state that is transferring to the system of programming, planning, and budgeting used in the West.

Having an objective view means you simply have to take both the bad and the good into account—otherwise, you will always look in the distorting mirror.

Baudys To Discuss NATO in United States

AU1811104093 Prague CTK in English 2200 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Excerpt] Cambridge, United States, Nov 17 (CTK)—The Czech Defense Minister Antonin Baudys, who is on a five-day visit to the United States, told CTK today that the main point of his unofficial discussion with his U.S. counterpart Les Aspin would be Aspin's proposal on the Partnership For Peace project, which is backed by the Czech Republic.

Baudys is attending a conference on ethnic conflicts and their impact on U.S. foreign and security policies, which is organized by the Institute For Analysis of Foreign Policy in cooperation with the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of the Tufts University. [passage omitted]

Meciar Sees 'No Reasons' To Replace Lexa

AU1811061993 Prague CTK in English 1119 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Bratislava, Nov 17 (CTK)— Slovak Premier Vladimir Meciar rejected speculations over possible nominations for Slovak privatization minister during his regular address on Slovak Television November 16. Slovak President Michal Kovac did not accept my proposal, and so the things stayed the way they had been, Meciar said.

The present state of affairs at the ministry is not bad, Meciar said, and State Secretary of the Privatization Ministry Ivan Lexa will remain in his post, as he has proved himself capable professionally, morally, and in dealing with people, Meciar said.

Meciar, who has been authorized to direct the ministry, said that such an arrangement makes for more orderly and clear relations, and accelerates the privatization process. He said there were no reasons why Lexa should be replaced as head of the Government Office, a post he also holds.

Lexa has been mentioned lately in connection with his remarks addressed to President Kovac, who has repeatedly refused to appoint him as minister for privatization. A state prosecutor has meanwhile asked the director of the Slovak Investigations Office to open a case against Lexa on charges of defaming the president.

In his November 11 press release, Lexa said that he had never given in during his period of cooperation with Meciar and never behaved as some former communists, who today make a show of spending weekends in church.

HZDS To Initiate Dismissal of Prosecutor General

AU1811075693 Bratislava REPUBLIKA in Slovak 15 Nov 93 pp 1, 2

[TA SR report: "Let Us Rise Above Personal Disputes"]

[Excerpt] Levice—[passage omitted]

No Changes at Privatization Ministry

Speaking after the meeting of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] leadership at Levice [on 13 November], Vladimir Meciar said that the situation at the Ministry for the Administration and Privatization of National Property was a question of principle for him. If he is to be responsible for the government and the privatization process, he must be able to choose his own people. "Privatization will continue under myself as minister and with State Secretary Ivan Lexa entrusted by me with the executive work. There are no reasons for changes," he stressed. In view of the fact that, under the coalition agreement, the post of state secretary at this ministry was to be filled by the Slovak National Party, Vladimir Meciar said that the coalition partner would be given two posts of state secretaries at economic ministries. Which ministries will be specified at the next coalition talks, according to Vladimir Meciar.

Personal Disputes Have No Business in Politics

In conjunction with Ivan Lexa's statements directed against the person of the Slovak president, Vladimir Meciar said that "it would not be good if we had people again who must not be criticized. I see a great risk therein." In his opinion, even the person of the president can be subjected to criticism, as long as this criticism does not exceed the limits of the law. According to the prime minister, members of the HZDS leadership thoroughly examined the causes of the president's dispute with Ivan Lexa. "We do not rejoice at it and, therefore, we propose the possibility of rising above it all," he said.

Commission for Personnel Issues

The exposure of so-called mafia practices in the privatization process will, according to Vladimir Meciar, depend on what action will be taken by the Slovak General Prosecutor's Office. He said that government members were voicing permanent dissatisfaction with the general prosecutor's approach. "For several weeks he has been ignoring all my invitations to government meetings," Vladimir Meciar stressed. The Slovak prime minister did not rule out that HZDS deputies might propose, at the November or December meeting of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, that Vojtech Bacho be recalled from the post of prosecutor general.

Speaking about personnel issues, Vladimir Meciar reported that a single candidate, Viliam Sobona, was being considered for the post of HZDS deputy chairman in charge of media policy, which has become vacant because of Roman Zelenay's death. He specified, however, that so far this proposal has not been voted on by the republican leadership. No other personnel issues were subject of discussion. In this context Vladimir Meciar said that a five-member commission has been set up to deal with personnel issues. The post of state secretary at the Slovak Ministry of Culture [which also became vacant because of Roman Zelenay's death] will, according to the prime minister, be filled by a candidate of the Slovak National Party. [passage omitted]

Lexa Investigated on Charges of Defaming Kovac

AU1711194093 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 15 Nov 93 p 1

["rr"-signed report: "The 'Lexa' Affair Passed on to the Investigator"]

[Text] Bratislava—In a letter dated 12 November, Ivan Seges, LLD, from the General Prosecutor's Office of the Slovak Republic asked the director of the Office of Investigations of the Slovak Interior Ministry's Police Corps "to secure the expeditious start of criminal proceedings on charges of defamation of the republic and its representative, according to Article 103 of the Penal

Code, and, after performing the requisite acts, to determine the criminal liability of the person that committed this criminal offense." Statements made by [head of Slovak Government Office and state secretary at the Ministry for the Administration and Privatization of National Property] Ivan Lexa about the president of the republic in newspaper interviews for SMENA and REPUBLIKA are to become subject of this investigation.

Lexa Accuses Kovac of Slander

AU1711193993 Prague CTK in English 0925 GMT 11 Nov 93

[Text] Bratislava, Nov 11 (CTK)—SMENA, the daily close to the governing Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) carries an interview with Ivan Lexa, whose candidacy to the post of privatization minister has been rejected by President Kovac a few days ago. Lexa insists that Kovac's reservations about himself are exclusively personal, what led to his being rejected as a ministerial candidate.

The reservations origin from the days when he, Lexa, repeatedly expressed his opposition against Kovac's candidacy to the presidential post, Lexa is quoted as saying. I cast doubt on his morals, professional abilities, as well as on his age. I documented this by Kovac's lower efficiency at work, and measures taken by him, which had been either on the border of ethics or behind it, Lexa says. He adds that he is speaking of slandering, excessive ambitiousness, and intrigue-based working methods.

In another interview carried by the daily REPUBLIKA, issued by the Slovak news agency (TA SR), Lexa rejects a speculation that his candidature might have been rejected due to his father, who is referred to as the former deputy chairman of the socialist government and present employee of Harvard privatization funds. Lexa stresses that it is not true that his father has been participating in the Harvard funds. Those monitoring family members should draw attention to the fact that the president's son is an extremely successful businessman, Lexa underlines. He, the son, is expert in trade, including foreign one, and he becomes comfortable with casinos, Lexa states, insisting that he does not reproach anything to anybody, and that he even wishes everything to president's son, on the condition that he pays taxes and meets all legal provisions.

Lexa says that he does not believe that Kovac consulted the draft government with the opposition. It is completely unusual. In which country does the opposition compose the government? he concludes in REPUBLIKA.

Kovac on Europe, Relations With Meciar

LD1711213493 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Excerpts] President Michal Kovac granted an interview to Radiozurnal, Slovak television, Czech television, and Czech radio. The Czech colleagues, naturally, were interested most of all in the internal political questions of Slovakia and the relationship of the president to the prime minister.

First of all, here is the answer to the question on whether and how the Czech Republic and Slovakia will, within the Visegrad Four, proceed in integrating into European structures.

[Begin recording] [Kovac] We have agreed on the principles that we want to defend as Central European countries and as nenbers of the Visegrad group. We did not have to talk about the actual steps, because the demand for actual steps will probably emerge only after the viewpoint, which should be reached at the Brussels summit in the beginning of next year, is known.

[Unidentified correspondent] There are reports that U.S. President Bill Clinton will visit Prague. Did you talk, in this connection, about possible policies regarding the mutual relations between the Czech Republic and Slovakia or the United States in relation to the integration into the above structures?

[Kovac] As President Havel told us, nothing has been agreed definitively. If we do not know the agenda and the aims in detail, it is difficult for us to agree on any steps.

[Correspondent] Traditionally, the president enjoys great respect in the Slovak Republic. Nevertheless, I think that this is not enough to explain the great leap forward that you have scored in your popularity with the Slovak public. So why is it so, in your view?

[Kovac] You are right. The citizens of the Slovak Republic perceive the office of the president with much greater seriousness than actually given by the true constitutional role of the president of the republic. It may also be because the citizens of the Slovak Republic have gotten used to governments and know, especially now, after 1989, that governments are composed of individual parties. Although the parties try to represent the interests of all the citizens, not all the citizens look at the government with equal sympathies, equal trust, equal support. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] How would you assess your relationship with Prime Minister Meciar? Is it a friendly relationship, a conflict relationship, or a necessary relationship?

[Kovac] I do not think that it is important in politics what personal relationships are like. Naturally, it would be ideal if it were a relationship of mutual trust and maybe it would be bad if it were a relationship of friendship because in a relationship of friendship one would forgive the other what should not be forgiven. But we are concerned that it be a proper relationship, fully respecting the constitutional powers of the individual officials. This is what I am striving for. [end recording]

Cernak Discusses Coalition Partners' Differences

AU1711204393 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 16 Nov 93 p 4

[Interview with Slovak National Party Chairman Ludovit Cernak by Oldrich Zabojnik; place and date not given: "The Government Is Unable To Overcome Its Fear of Privatization"]

[Text] [Zabojnik] Let us start with that which is most striking about the stagnant process of transformation in Slovakia: The sluggish, if not halted, privatization. What is your view of this problem?

[Cernak] The concept submitted by former Minister [of Privatization] Dolgos was worked out sufficiently to prevent dirty practices and make the entire process transparent. Emphasis was placed, for example, on public tenders. By changing tack in the middle of the privatization process we needlessly lost time.

[Zabojnik] The broad-based public discussion on privatization conducted by the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] seems to contradict your opinion. Is there a discrepancy here, or not?

[Cernak] This whole public discussion and all the seminars convened in Presov, Trencianske Teplice, and elsewhere and attended by a magnitude of experts are a specialty of the prime minister. The more experts come together, the fewer problems are resolved. The effect of these large meetings is rather theatrical.

[Zabojnik] But why is he doing all this, when we realize that it is absolutely clear by now that, without privatization, one will not move from the spot.

[Cernak] The government is unable to overcome its fear of privatization, it is unable to embark energetically upon the path of reinforcing the private sector. The most important step toward depoliticizing privatization would be, in my opinion, the abolition of the Ministry of Privatization and the strengthening of the National Property Fund, which should be turned into a politically independent expert institution. Privatization must run its course regardless of possible political crises or changes in governments.

[Zabojnik] It is known that you take exception to Slovakia's course of action thus far in the economy. What are your specific objections?

[Cernak] For example, the promises being given to workers that they have the same chance under privatization are illusory. Let there be employee stock ownership, because it motivates people, but someone must make the decisions and engage in business. A reasonable economic policy must seek to establish a strong middle class of capitalists. We need Slovak millionaires in Slovakia who will invest here and set business in motion.

[Zabojnik] Your words suggest that it may have been rather uneasy to bring about a certain harmonization of the HZDS's and the Slovak National Party's views on the economy?

[Cernak] At the very beginning [of the coalition talks] the prime minister said that he knew our economic program very well and that it was written roughly in the diction of their ideas about transformation. At the very end, before all kinds of absurd political and personnel issues were raised, our partners from the HZDS started to speak about the incompatibility of our economic programs. Mr. Huska, sitting on the other side of the table, said that while we were clearly and toughly drifting to the right, toward the private sector, they are advocates of a participative [participativni] economy. But in the economy you cannot totter along some kind of a third way.

[Zabojnik] What is the upshot of all this?

[Cernak] The HZDS simply lacks an economic policy and, therefore, it is conserving the status quo. Mr. Meciar won the elections by his sharp criticism of Klaus's restrictive policy, but the present restrictions in Slovakia are even tougher than they were in the federation. I do not suspect the HZDS of ulterior political motives, nor do I accuse it of economic incompetence. In my opinion, it is because of fear, absence of a concept, and lack of coordination that it conserves the status quo.

Cernak Discusses Divisions Within SNS

AU1711123193

[Editorial Report] Bratislava SMENA in Slovak on 10 November and Bratislava SME in Slovak on 10 November both publish interviews with Ludovit Cernak, chairman of the Slovak National Party [SNS], in which he discussed divisions within his party following the conclusion of a coalition with the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]. Both interviews were conducted on 9 November, after a meeting of the SNS Political Board.

Bratislava SMENA in Slovak on 10 November on page 2 carries a 600-word interview with Ludovit Cernak by Alena Melicharkova entitled "The Situation Is Transparent." The interview contains the following passage:

[Melicharkova] "SNS Deputy Vladimir Miskovsky speaks about the fragmentation of views within the SNS in connection with the coalition formation. Is the party about to split?"

[Cernak] "Today's meeting of the SNS Political Board was attended by Mr. Miskovsky as a full member; hence, the press reports about this departure have not been confirmed. Vlado [Miskovsky] is one of the party's founders and he is interested in the SNS becoming a modern party with an intelligent policy. I am convinced that the SNS's further course of action will be such that it will find a way of addressing even people who hold views such as Mr. Miskovsky."

[Melicharkova] "But reservations about the party's joining the coalition do exist."

[Cernak] "We have joined the coalition because we considered it an optimal solution to the situation on the Slovak political scene. We have taken many steps to accommodate the other side's wishes and we would feel sorry if the coalition were to be destroyed now because of a single specific person. The SNS has said clearly: Coalition yes, but not at any price. That is, not at the price of unconstitutional steps or a struggle against the president. I do not expect a split but I will myself initiate an internal party debate and I am confident that the party will demonstrate that it is worthy of its voters."

[Melicharkova] "And what about an extraordinary congress?"

[Cernak] "I do not think that an extraordinary congress is necessary. The SNS Central Council has many powers, including the right to decide on the dilemmas that have to be tackled. Under the statutes, it can mete out disciplinary punishment, adopt important decisions, and so forth."

[Melicharkova] "Does the SNS leadership have the support of all the SNS's deputies in the National Council of the Slovak Republic regarding the coalition?"

[Cernak] "I have never concealed the existence of different views on the conclusion of the coalition, and I repeat this. Some deputies wanted the coalition at any cost, two or three did not want it under any circumstances, and the others were in between. We have agreed that the minority would subject itself to the majority. One deputy clearly declared that he disagreed but he remains in the SNS club of deputies and is a member of the SNS. When it comes to voting, however, he will act according to his best knowledge and conscience."

Bratislava SME in Slovak on 10 November on page 2 carries a 500- word interview with SNS Chairman Ludovit Cernak by Maria Hluchanova entitled "Split Means Extinction." In the interview, Cernak concedes that SNS deputy Vladimir Miskovsky is making his continued presence on the SNS Council, the party's leading body, conditional on the departure of Peter Sokol from that body, but he expresses his confidence that the party will manage to settle its internal differences.

The concluding passage of the interview reads:

[Hluchanova] "Are there currents within the SNS that might bring about the destabilization of its internal structures?"

[Cernak] "There exist differentiated views within the SNS on the methods used by some of our members during the [coalition] talks. We represent a party that is historically the oldest on the Slovak political scene. Any split would mean the end of this party. The SNS would not get into parliament again. This categorical statement was made in the debate at today's meeting of the Political Board. The differentiation of views is irrelevant in this case. We have unanimously accepted that the priority for us these days must be to do everything for the party that brought us to parliament. Doing everything does not mean doing absolutely everything, however. The party's program and one's conscience and personal honor represent the limit. We will never take steps that would force us to overstep this limit. This issue will be discussed at the next meeting of the SNS Central Council, where we must tell ourselves the plain truth and take a lesson from, and possibly draw conclusions against, those members who acted on their own. This does not concern groups, only individuals. Therefore, I do not speak about a split, but about getting rid of people who have damaged the party through their conduct."

[Hluchanova] "Do these people have a dominant standing in the SNS?"

[Cernak] "No, these are, for the time being, marginal people. Of course, the division of people into dominant personalities and others depends on one's angle of vision."

No-Confidence Vote Against Health Minister

AU1711204593 Prague CTK in English 1824 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Bratislava, Nov 17 (CTK)—In a close vote, the Slovak parliament passed a motion of no confidence in Health Minister Viliam Sobona in a secret ballot today. Of the 150-member parliament, 76 deputies voted for the motion, a narrow majority. All but twelve deputies were present.

This means that some deputies from the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS)—Slovak National Party (SNS) governing coalition voted for the motion of no confidence, because the new coalition has a mandate of 80 votes. Sobona is an HZDS member. Chairman of parliament Ivan Gasparovic said that the vote was in keeping with the Slovak Constitution.

Sobona is one of Slovak Premier and HZDS Chairman Vladimir Meciar's closest associates, and today's vote of no confidence will be a severe test of the new coalition's solidarity. It is thought that six coalition deputies voted for Sobona to leave, and that most of them were from the SNS.

When the SNS was still an opposition party, it expressed agreement with a petition calling for Sobona's resignation. The health minister was accused of incompetence, financial machinations, and bad management of the ministry. It is believed that during the recent coalition negotiations, SNS leaders strongly insisted that he be replaced, but that Meciar fundamentally disagreed. However, the fact that Sobona was proposed for HZDS deputy chairman at Saturday's party board meeting in Levice suggests that the government was beginning to think he might be leaving the government.

In a short speech to parliament, Sobona said that he respected the principles of parliamentary democracy and was not bitter. The Health Ministry had done a good bit of work under his leadership, he said, adding that fierce parliamentary debates had also helped the health service into a good starting position. I would ask you to ensure that this position is maintained, Sobona said.

In an interview with journalists, Sobona rejected the accusations made against him, especially that he had administered the Health Ministry's finances badly. He said he believed his ministry had not produced bad results, and that neither he nor his ministry colleagues had anything of which to be ashamed. It did not surprise me, and neither did it disappoint me, he said of parliament's verdict.

Court Decision on Danube Dam May Take 2 Years

AU1811061893 Prague CTK in English 1702 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Budapest, Nov 17 (CTK)— It may take up to two years for the International Court of Justice in The Hague to deliver its judgment on the dispute between Slovakia and Hungary about the damming and diversion of the Danube at Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, an unnamed expert representing Hungary in the dispute has told CTK.

The Hungarian news agency MTI today reported that foreign experts have been heard by a parliamentary committee for environmental protection. Experts believe that both Slovakia and Hungary will remain inflexible on the question. Should Hungary make concessions, however, it may appear as weakness and influence the final decision in Slovakia's favor. The committee also heard that Hungary will start to demolish the circular dam at Nagymaros next year.

The case was taken before the court at The Hague in spring this year. The dispute began in May 1992 when Hungary, citing environmental reasons, officially canceled the agreement on the project which it had been concluded with Czechoslovakia in 1977. In the autumn of 1992, however, Bratislava went ahead with the so-called variant C, and despite Hungarian protests unilaterally diverted water from the main bed of the Danube to a derivation channel on Slovak territory.

Parties Collect Signatures for Early Elections

AU1811062393 Prague CTK in English 1414 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Bratislava, Nov 17 (CTK)— Over 75,000 signatures have already been collected by the opposition Conservative Democratic Party (KDS) in a drive for calling early parliamentary elections in the Slovak Republic, KDS Chairman Pavol Hagyari told journalists today. He said that the Democratic Left Party (SDL), the second strongest political force in Slovakia, has also been considering joining the campaign.

The Party of Slovak Entrepreneurs and the Hungarian Civic Party (MOS) are also collecting signatures, he said. According to the Slovak Constitution, 350,000 signatures of citizens are needed to call early elections.

Hagyari said his party considered the establishment of the coalition government between the ruling Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) and the Slovak National Party (SNS) a sign of a temporary victory of lies and hatred over the truth and love.

Former prominent figures of the communist regime again hold high state posts, he said, referring to the fourth anniversary of the November 17, 1989, revolution. Purges in state administrative bodies evidence the return of old cadres and are reminiscent of the line of action of the communist power in revolutionary times, he added.

In the KDS's view, left-oriented and populist forces in Slovakia have abused the temporary economic problems which naturally accompany economic transformation to question the reforms themselves. These forces which came to power after the 1992 parliamentary elections bear the main responsibility for stepping down from the initial ideals of November 1989, Hagyari said.

Horn Views Domestic Politics, Party's Prospects

AU1611203693 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 13 Nov 93 p 19

[Interview with Socialist Party Chairman Gyula Horn by Lajos Pogonyi; place and date not given: "The MSZP Is Playing To Win, Not To Lose"]

[Excerpts] [Pogonyi] The popularity of the Socialist Party [MSZP] has, no doubt, increased gradually in the past year, and now the MSZP is already competing with the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ] for first place on the popularity list. Give us your opinion about this. To what extent is this the merit of the MSZP and to what extent is this the result of the lack of popularity of other parties, especially the coalition parties?

[Horn] Both factors are playing a role in the increasing popularity of the MSZP. Besides, the people have become disappointed with today's executive power. People think today that this national politics does not represent their interests. Many people abhor the style that some government officials allow themselves.

[Pogonyi] What do you mean?

[Horn] The arrogant and lecturing style. In the meantime, an increasing number of people are becoming aware of the fact that Hungary's current situation is considerably worse that it was in 1990.

[Pogonyi] You mean economically?

[Horn] First of all economically, but also socially. I wondered why Interior Minister Peter Boross kept saying that, if it formed a government, the opposition would only be able to govern for one year. He probably said that because he also knows several things that the opposition is not aware of. For example, we do not know what domestic and foreign financial obligations this government has taken upon itself, because these things have not yet been made public. These burdens affect the population and will also make the life of the next government more difficult. All I have said until now is that the role of the government in making the popularity of the MSZP grow. However, this is a less important factor. In my opinion, a more important factor is the political style that the MSZP has carried out over the past four years. We are courageously facing the parliamentary test. [passage omitted]

[Pogonyi] Please tell us where is the MSZP on the current political field and the current party structure. Who represents this party's basis?

[Horn] In my opinion, the basis of our party reflects our social structure in Hungary. Almost every strata, including the workers and entrepreneurs, are represented in our party. Our party's leading figures are also popular in the provinces. An increasing number of intellectuals also support us. Of course, there are some strata, like the hard right-wing core, that are not influenced by the MSZP. [passage omitted]

[Pogonyi] I know that you do not engage in forecasting, but I am nevertheless curious: How many mandates do you think the MSZP will get next year? According to Matyas Szuros, the MSZP will double the number of its parliamentary deputies.

[Horn] I think Matyas Szuros evaluated the situation realistically. I admit that I do not deal with such numbers. I have one goal, namely to achieve better results than in 1990. We have the chance to achieve this goal. It is difficult to forecast the actual size of our parliamentary representation. In my opinion, the MSZP has the chance of emerging from the election campaign as the strongest party. [passage omitted]

[Pogonyi] Have you heard the opinions saying that the MSZP does not actually want to win very much and that it actually plays to lose?

[Horn] I also heard opinions saying that we have not yet elected our prime minister nominee because we do not really want to get into power. All this is nonsense. What kind of party does not want to win? I know of an international example in which a left-wing party did everything in its power to avoid fulfilling the role of a constructive opposition. This policy almost led to the total disintegration of the party. We must play to win because this government must be replaced, and this can only be achieved through election results. It is another matter that there are also people within the MSZP, albeit an insignificant number of people, who say that the MSZP should not get into the government next year. There are also opinions according to which the MSZP has time to wait until the year 2002. If, next year, we can influence the processes under way in Hungary more than today, with this we will be able to lay the foundations of Hungary's future. If not, the MSZP will lose a great opportunity. Things will not get better by themselves. If no positive developments occur in the economy, in the social sphere, and even in strengthening our democratic institutions, the situation will be even worse in the coming years. [passage omitted]

[Pogonyi] Have you already considered how to coordinate the political opportunities of the MSZP with the economic needs?

[Horn] If we make it into the government, our first step will be to evaluate the real situation because, today, the opposition is not in a position to know the real situation of Hungary in detail. As I know, Hungary's agreement with the IMF will end on 30 June 1994. We need professional people in key economic positions. We must create an almost omnipotent economic cabinet. The signing of a new agreement with the IMF will be essential for Hungary's solvency. First, the new government will have to draw the major tasks for six months or for one year, to halt the further increase in our budget deficit, handle inflation, and avoid the further catastrophic deterioration of our balance of payments, as well as to revive the parts of Hungarian agriculture that can still be saved, and to work out a social policy for one or two

years. This is an extremely difficult task. Politics must not interfere in the activity of the economic management. [passage omitted]

SZDSZ Official Views Party's Character

AU1611212493 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 12 Nov 93 p 3

[Interview with Janos Kis, member of the National Council of the Alliance of Free Democrats, by Szabolcs Szereto; place and date not given: "The SZDSZ Is a Serious and Calm Party That Is Open in All Directions"]

[Text] It will be five years tomorrow that the Network of Free Initiatives set up by the democratic opposition on 1 May 1988 in the Jurta theater established the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ]. The free democrats will celebrate the anniversary with a grand program at the Budapest Sports Hall tonight. We interviewed philosopher Janos Kis, a leading personality of the former democratic opposition and first chairman of the SZDSZ who is now a member of the SZDSZ's National Council.

[Szereto] To what extent is the SZDSZ a faithful heir of the democratic opposition and to what extent do its activities correspond to the principles its predecessors represented?

[Kis] The SZDZS is the only significant party in Hungary that has not had scandals over its headquarters and that has not confused pragmatism with abandoning principles: The SZDSZ is an honest and serious party.

[Szereto] The party's five-year history was not free of crisis periods. The inner conflicts came to the surface precisely at the time of your withdrawal, in the autumn of 1991. Many people think that the roots of the disagreement stemmed from the SZDSZ's radical attitude at the time of the change of the regime. Do you agree with this view?

[Kis] In 1989 and 1990, the SZDSZ attracted members and electors in two ways. The program of Hungarian bourgeois transformation and westernization was one of these, and the efforts to consistently dismantle the party state was the other. This party did not accept the deals made between the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party [MSZMP] of the time and the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] of the time. For this reason, many people thought that, in addition to the communist system, the SZDSZ is also an archenemy of the communists as individuals, and it will take a leading role in the showdown. Thus, the fast-increasing membership of the SZDSZ had a group that expected the party to get even with the individuals. In my view, we can continue to affirm our radicalism against the previous regime. However, we had to get over the noisy anticommunism of some of the membership, especially because the moment of the change of the regime is gone and ruminating over the past grievances does not help solve the country's current problems. This was not without shocks, but it is finished now. This was one of the reasons for the party's crisis.

The other reason was that the SZDSZ's first leaders came from the democratic opposition, who were suitable leaders in the heroic age but not at the time of professionalism. Therefore, a considerable rearrangement of personnel had to take place in the party leadership and this was not a simple matter. However, this is also finished now, without losing the "founding fathers" from the party.

[Szereto] Whose party is the SZDSZ; which social strata's votes do you expect to get in 1994?

[Kis] The SZDSZ is a people's party in the sense that it is not the party of a certain social stratum or a defined interest group. We mainly expect people who want a bourgeois Hungary, a modern and westernized market economy, an efficient but not overbearing state that considers it important to respect the rights of citizens, and who would like the national minority issue to be resolved through conciliation with the neighbors. Every major social stratum has many people like this.

[Szereto] Recently, it seems that the SZDSZ has been trying to take over the role of the calm force from the MDF....

[Kis] I also think that the SZDSZ's current leadership is characterized by calmness and balance and its politics are predictable. It has the respect within the party that, giving it the necessary room for maneuver, makes these calm and balanced politics possible.

[Szereto] With which political forces do you think it possible to form close cooperation to achieve your goals?

[Kis] There are two parliamentary liberal parties. Of these, the SZDSZ rather sees itself as a social-liberal party while, at the moment, the leaders of the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ] define their party as conservative and national-liberal. Even if we consider the differences that result from this, we can establish that the FIDESZ stands closest to the SZDSZ out of the parliamentary parties. In addition to this, the SZDSZ's leadership managed to form good relations with some parties outside parliament; the Agrarian Federation, the Entrepreneurs Party, and the Republic Party can be listed here. At the moment, the SZDSZ is open in all directions and it is mainly striving for election results that will give ample scope for maneuver to the liberal parties in deciding whom they choose as coalition partners.

[Szereto] From what you are saying, it follows that the liberal parties can find coalition partners for themselves both from the right and the left....

[Kis] The SZDSZ has not joined the hysteria campaign against the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP]. It would also like to keep the bridges toward the right. We are only closed to the extremes. Naturally, it is not always easy to

decide where the extremes end and where the moderate politics that are ready for negotiations begins. It is enough to think about the overlaps between the MDF and the Hungarian Life and Justice Party.

Industry Minister Joins Christian Democrats

AU1711194293 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 17 Nov pp 1,5

[Interview with Industry and Trade Minister Janos Latorcai by Jozsef Peter; place and date not given: "A Government Member Chooses a Party—Latorcai in the Christian Democratic People's Party"]

[Text] Industry and Trade Minister Janos Latorcai confirmed the fresh press reports on 16 November: He has joined the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP]. We asked the minister what motivated his decision.

[Latorcai] All those who know me are aware of the fact that I was attracted to the KDNP from the very beginning. Therefore, from this point of view, my current decision can be regarded as quite natural. Ever since I became a minister and an MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] cabinet member, I have been consistently implementing my decision that I work here as an expert and carry out a government task. However, elections will be held in May 1994. So, in order to be able to run in the colors of the KDNP, I must be a party member. Therefore, an earlier membership was not realistic, and a late membership would not be tactful.

I hope that this decision will not affect my position in the coming period because, as long as I am acting as a government member and minister of the Hungarian Democratic Forum cabinet, I will not accept any party task or position, so that I can carry out my tasks deriving from the government responsibility.

[Peter] Are you participating in formulating the economic program of the KDNP?

[Latorcai] Of course, I am working on it as an expert, and I have already participated in working out the program of the KDNP.

[Peter] On what list will you run in the elections?

[Latorcai] We have not yet clarified this, but it is absolutely certain that I will not run as an individual candidate.

[Peter] Will your decision not upset the coalition balance, given the fact that there will now be three KDNP ministers in the government?

[Latorcai] As I said, I want to maintain my clear expert position, but if the prime minister thinks that the coalition balance has been upset, I will clearly draw the necessary conclusions.

[Peter] There are people who interpret your step as a way to guarantee yourself a ministerial position for the next four years.

[Latorcai] I do not think that something like this can be guaranteed with such a step because, for this, we must achieve an election result in which the KDNP gets the necessary positions and, naturally, the party must also consider me as a possible minister.

[Peter] Has your decision changed anything in your position?

[Latorcai] Nothing has changed. Nothing shows this better than the fact that I will participate in five or six MDF economic forums in the near future, while no similar KDNP forum is on my agenda.

Walesa Talks With Officials on Defense, Security

LD1711190093 Warsaw PAP in English 1642 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Warsaw, Nov. 17—President Lech Walesa on Wednesday received Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak, Defence Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk, Head of General Staff Tadeusz Wilecki and Head of the National Security Office (BBN), also Secretary of State in the Defence Ministry Jerzy Milewski, the presidential press bureau announced.

The talks covered the questions of Poland's defence system and security as well as the appropriate functioning and coordination of state organs responsible for this field. The meeting also included a review of questions related to the special responsibility of the president, prime minister, the National Defence Committee (KOK), the Council of Ministers, and the Defence Ministry.

Participants in the meeting also stressed the necessity to coordinate actions between the above institutions and persons for the benefit of Poland's defence ability. They agreed to devote the next KOK meeting to these questions.

Walesa Comments on Meeting

LD1811134193 Warsaw PAP in English 1221 GMT 18 Nov 93

[Text] Warsaw, Nov. 18—President Lech Walesa said that his Wednesday's meeting with the prime minister, defence minister and other state officials responsible for Poland's security was a "fragment of a great putting in order of the Polish scene," and was not caused by the appearance of any threat to Poland's security.

Speaking in an interview for PAP, the president said that he would take a decision on running for the second term as president in the end of 1994. He added he would retire if things were going well in Poland. "If things take a bad course, I will fight," Walesa said.

Asked to comment on the governments plans to change the tax system, Walesa said that the government should deal with the issue very carefully.

Two Deputy Defense Ministers Resign

LD1711125093 Warsaw PAP in English 1216 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Warsaw, Nov. 17—Deputy Defence Minister Przemyslaw Grudzinski on Wednesday resigned from the post. Also on Wednesday, another Deputy Defence Minister Bronislaw Komorowski said his resignation from the post has been accepted by Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak.

Sejm Elects Members of Constitutional Tribunal

LD1711223993 Warsaw PAP in English 2001 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Warsaw, Nov. 17—The Sejm (lower house) on Wednesday elected Janusz Trzcinski deputy chairman of the Constitutional Tribunal and Zdzislaw Czeszejko-Sochacki, Lech Garlicki, Stefan Jan Jaworski, Wojciech Sokolewicz and Blazej Wierzbowski as members of the tribunal, with 293 deputies voting for, 25 against and 57 abstaining.

The term of the present deputy chairman and five other members of the Constitutional Tribunal expires in November. Members of the tribunal are elected for eight-year terms but half of its composition is changed by the Sejm every four years.

On Friday, the Sejm is expected to elect chair of the Constitutional Tribunal. The post has been vacant since May of this year when the Sejm accepted the resignation of former Chairman Mieczyslaw Tyczka.

Kolodziejczyk: NATO 'Relic' in Present Form

LD1711163393 Warsaw PAP in English 1545 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Warsaw, Nov. 17—Defence Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk said at his first press conference on Wednesday that "Poland will never give up its road leading to NATO" but stressed that in its present shape NATO is a "relic" and should be transformed to become the pillar of European security.

Referring to the Russian defence doctrine, the minister said that the Russian military doctrine was only given "a makeup," though he admitted that the doctrine will remain in force for some time.

Olechowski Describes Main Policy Principles

LD1711163593 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1500 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] [Announcer] Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrzej Olechowski said at a news conference [on 17 November] that Polish diplomacy did not imagine the creation of a general system of European security without the participation of Russia and other countries that have emerged after the demise of the USSR. According to Minister Olechowski, all Poland's efforts to participate in the Euro-Atlantic system should not be treated as an escape from the neighbors because such policy would not be sensible. Minister Olechowski said:

[Begin Olechowski recording] In the capacity of minister of foreign affairs I will be guided by three principles: consensus, specifics, and economy.

Consensus concerns mainly the methods according to which I will act on the political scene at home. To make foreign policy effective it is necessary for the country to speak in one voice to be heard abroad. I will make real

efforts to implement this principle. I will seek consensus with regard to all centers of power, the president, the government, and the parliament, and with regard to important political forces, in parliament and outside parliament. Poland has not yet reached the stage of cosmetic activity in its foreign policy, but is at the stage of establishing the foundations of foreign policy. [end recording]

Foreign Affairs Minister Interviewed

WS1711153093 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 17 Nov 93 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrzej Olechowski by Katarzyna Kolodziejczyk and Maciej Lukasiewicz; place and date not given: "We Are More Part of the West Than the East"]

[Text] [RZECZPOSPOLITA] Mr. Minister, the political leadership has changed in Poland. Does this guarantee that the Polish foreign policy which has been pursued to date will not be changed? I mean integration with the European Union [EU], membership in NATO, and good relations with our neighbors. Some statements by representatives of the Democratic Left Alliance on security and by representatives of the Polish Peasant Party on customs barriers and protectionism may raise doubts whether the main direction of our international policy will be maintained.

[Olechowski] I believe that statements by Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak and coalition leaders on this issue clearly imply that Poland will follow the same road, only on its left side, as POLITYKA wrote when discussing the economic program of the new government.

Protectionism is a disquieting issue indeed. There is very strong pressure in this direction in our country, in our economy. This will have to be protested. There is no doubt that the minister of foreign affairs will take such steps as well.

Generally, as far as Polish foreign policy is concerned, the prime minister spoke very clearly in his official speech in the Sejm about the implementation of the three fundamental directions that you have asked about. This is also proved by my definite statements, as well as statements by President Walesa, who has never been hesitant in these issues. Let me add that during my hearings in front of three Sejm committees, I got the impression that there is a national consensus on these aims.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] We can make the assumption, however, that you, as the new head of Polish diplomacy, are going to introduce some changes; you may place the stress differently, or you may also introduce changes in the instruments. If you introduce them, what will they be?

[Olechowski] I have had a lot of experience with the economy, so I will certainly put more stress on it. I will also want to specify and stress the contribution that Poland is making in the areas of security, economy, and in the process of European integration. We want to take part in that process, not only because we would like very much to become an equal member of the EU, which would yield us definite profits; we also want to take part in it because it is favorable to Europe as well.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] How are you going to shape our relations with Russia? Will the stress be placed differently here as well? You have often declared acceleration, activation of our policy on "the Eastern wall."

[Olechowski] Since I have been in my present post for a mere two weeks, I can only make a general statement. I will try to define this in the following way: our formal relations seem to me to be very correct. Contacts at the highest levels, I mean personal relations between both presidents, are very good indeed. However, the overall relations in general seem to lack more concrete, everyday content; they lack friendliness, as it were...

I would like to change this. Poland attaches great importance to these relations in the area of economy; however, it would like first of all Russia and other neighbors in the East to strengthen democracy and free market in their countries. We would like to favor this through everyday, substantive contacts and initiatives.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] The discussions on broadening NATO and our possible membership in this organization have been going on for some time now. Are you not alarmed at the information about the Russian military doctrine?

[Olechowski] Russia's stand on NATO is indeed an ambiguous and disconcerting signal. This concern is heightened by various statements made in Moscow which seem to revive the old concept of a sphere of influence.

This sounds very bad and rings alarms bells here. The trouble is that we cannot positively say to what extent these statements are important and valid, and to what extent they are mere information noise, related to the internal situation in Russia.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] How, then, are we going to shape our relations with Russia?

[Olechowski] We have no doubts that in the long run Russia will strive for democracy and a market economy. The Russians are already aware of the fact that it costs a lot of money to build an empire and to pursue a policy of domination; they understand that it can only be carried out at the cost of suffering and poverty of large numbers of people. Therefore, I do not think that such a direction of policy could be supported by the people there. The Russians have already seen what the world outside looks like, they have experienced "glasnost"; they also have satellite antennas, and I do not think they will allow the superpower ambition of the state to come before personal freedoms and well-being.

However, the process of political transformation under way in Russia is causing side effects, such as frustration, conflicts, and unrest. Therefore, we are afraid of a lack of stability if developments whose results are difficult to predict take place in Russia within a short time. It is for this reason that we are striving to broaden our safety system and base it on Western structures.

In the long run, we want to have closer ties with the West, because we feel more part of the West than the East—because of our civilization, history, and for many other reasons.

Let us bear in mind that both the West and the East will one day be part of an integrated Europe, of one all-European system. This is our hope and this is for what we want to strive.

I would like to stress, however, that Poland cannot imagine a lasting security, also its own security, in a system that would not in any way include Russia.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Talking about the East. What are you going to do to expedite the signing of the treaty with Lithuania and to improve the situation of the Polish minority in that country?

[Olechowski] The treaty with Lithuania is the only treaty in the relations with our neighbors that has not yet been signed. Also, there is something strange about the fact that it is the last treaty that we will sign. I do not think that in this case we are to blame.

Poland treats Lithuania with friendliness; Poles do not have any bad intentions toward the Lithuanians. If there is anything that could impede drawing up a good treaty with that state, it will unfortunately be nationalist reminiscences in Lithuania itself. I personally believe that they do not reflect the Lithuanians' feelings toward Poland; they are created by politicians. It is obvious that in our relations with Lithuania, as well as with other states where Poles live, we will be trying to see to it that those Poles have the chance to develop their Polish character in a safe manner—as a national minority.

In Poland, we have resolved the problem of national minorities in a generally accepted way and we would like Poles living outside of Poland to be treated similarly; this treatment should be based on European standards and on respect for human and civil rights.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] How do you evaluate the possibilities of developing Poland's cooperation with Belarus or Ukraine?

[Olechowski] Our country maintains very vivid relations with Ukraine and we attach great importance to them. I evaluate them as good and I would like them to be more dynamic. I used to be a member of the consultative committee of the presidents of Poland and Ukraine, so I am familiar with these subjects. I want the list of issues that was drawn up at that time to be implemented. There are a few economic plans that we would like to back up. They pertain to such areas as banking and the oil industry; we would also like to cooperate with Belarus and Ukraine in the area of communication.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] An important problem that Ukraine has been suggesting, both to us and to other states, is the issue of security. What is our answer?

[Olechowski] It is not only Poland that can decide whether or not Ukraine will become a member of the Vysegrad Group. The group itself is a difficult initiative and does not always stir up the enthusiasm of its members. We would not like to broaden the group if this were detrimental to strengthening what has already been achieved.

We will also want both Ukraine and Belarus to take part in all the European and global initiatives related to security, such as the "partnership for peace" initiative. There cannot be any doubt that these states must be equal members and subjects of such initiatives and international bodies.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Talking about security. How do you evaluate the presence of the United States in Europe and how are you going to handle our relations with the United States?

[Olechowski] These relations are a fragment of the basis of our foreign policy. From experience, I know that relations with the United States have always been very concrete and partnership-like. Right now, we can see a certain ambivalent attitude of U.S. citizens toward the role of their country in today's world. Americans have begun a political debate on that. We hope that, despite the costs, the United States, for the sake of its own long-term security, will continue to be a state that supports the building of democratic systems which guard the fundamental values of democracy.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] We would feel safer if our journey to West European structures took place sooner than it seems now.

[Olechowski] At the meeting of the "Weimar Triangle" in Warsaw, France and Germany committed themselves to propose our association with the West European Union. I think that this is a concrete and clear signal that is essentially different from the proposal that we should come closer to the Western security system in an evolutional manner. However, we must understand that a decision whether or not to admit a state to an alliance is not all that easy. A serious debate must be held; there must be enough time for the process of preparation. All this takes time.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] This situation of a certain "suspension," in which the West is keeping us, is the cause of severe criticism from both the right and the left side, arguing that the balance sheet of our Western option is rather mediocre.

[Olechowski] I will put it this way: That is simply not true. We have gained a lot in the last four years. From 1 January onward, we will be an associate member of the

EU; the European security systems of preventing conflicts have been strengthened. We have started friendly and intensive contacts with Western states, with the leading states of the Western world. If, God forbid, something suddenly were to happen to us, we would no longer be in a situation where everyone would say: Why, what do I care—this is happening somewhere in Poland, which means nowhere.

I am very satisfied with the last meeting with Minister Klaus Kinkel and Minister Alain Juppe, which was held in Warsaw last week. We are beginning to implement the cause of our associate membership in the EU. However, note one thing—the term "associate member" has yet to be clearly defined. Therefore, we are now going to put forward our proposals and our expectations in this area. We will also talk about how we would gradually become full members. The problem is to sort things out, find a common language, and combine various deadlines, stages, criteria, aims, and so on and so forth.

Please note one more thing: the initiative of partnership for peace, which was submitted by the Americans right before the talks on security in Travemunde. I understand that this idea is closely connected with our future membership in NATO. We would also like this initiative to include clear criteria and rules, which would determine the road of a given state to NATO; they would show the various stages of cooperation before full membership.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Let us now get back to Poland. I have heard opinions that there are several decision-making centers for such an important area as foreign policy; they are the president, the government, and the parliament. Who do you think should define the aims of foreign policy and where should the final decisions be made?

[Olechowski] I will say something that is very close to me and do not look upon it as an attempt to evade your question. I believe that if we want our foreign policy to be effective, especially now that we are still at the stage of dealing with the most fundamental interests of the state and not putting the finishing touches on what was decided long ago, the policy must be based on a consensus of both authority centers and political forces.

Therefore, as I declared in the parliament, I will try to reach such a consensus in all the most important issues concerning foreign policy. I can see no reason why this should not be done. I believe that both public opinion and the fundamental political forces have similar views in this area.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Is Polish diplomacy, headed by you, going to increase its activities that would serve the purpose of promoting the Polish economy and facilitating commercial contacts with the world?

[Olechowski] I think that if you sign an agreement or an international contract, it is only the beginning of the road, not the end of it. This will be the characteristic feature of my approach and I believe that the entire ministry will agree with me.

As for promoting Polish goods and broadening commercial possibilities, new markets must be opened.

We have talked, for example, with representatives of Turkey—a country which might be a window to the world for us, a window for the markets of the Persian Gulf states. During talks in Warsaw, the Turkish president approved of the initiative and gave assurances that he would take care of it. We also think that the markets of the Far East are very promising to us. Our relations with China have developed so well that they are beginning to take on a strategic character.

However, we still lack a coherent concept of taking advantage of our economic potential in trade; we are working on such a concept and we are going to put it into effect. A very important task of diplomacy is creating a favorable atmosphere around Poland and around our enterprises. We must always find time and energy for these issues. Thus, our embassies will certainly have more economic work to do.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] What changes, if any, are you going to introduce in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MSZ]?

[Olechowski] This ministry needs to be seriously modernized. We want to draw up a report on the changes that should be made; we will propose general directions as well as a schedule. I believe that we will get it over with in three months.

Naturally, this will also entail personnel changes. It is the fourth central office with which I have worked. The personnel situation in MSZ is probably best known because this ministry is being watched all the time, for example by a Sejm committee (ambassadorial appointments, etc). It is obvious that our personnel are just like anywhere else in Poland, and so the skills of the people often raise questions. For some time now we have been hiring new employees through a contest system. We also have increasingly more professional diplomats, who do not come to MSZ through the same channels as they came a few years ago. Foreign policy is a category of long-term, more stable options. Therefore, I do not think that the ministry should be subject to political changes and dependent on whether this or that government is in power.

Thus, the changes that I am going to introduce in the ministry should lead to more dynamic relations with other states; at the same time, they should guarantee that the strategy that has been pursued so far in Polish foreign policy will be maintained.

Poll: Most Citizens Want Full Parliament Term

WS1711153293 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 17 Nov 93 p 2

[Report by R.W.: "Four Years for Parliament; Social Research Institute for RZECZPOSPOLITA"]

[Text] **More than half of adult Poles think the 19 September election results do not justify ordering early elections, and so the next elections should take place in four years, that is to say after a full term by the parliament. But only every third Pole is convinced that the scenario will really materialize, and that the parliament will survive unchanged until 1997. The poll was conducted for RZECZPOSPOLITA by the Sopot-based Social Research Institute [PBS] in mid-October.**

Those who are in favor of a full term for the parliament, are first of all supporters of the parties which achieved a victory in the recent elections—the Democratic Left Alliance, the Polish Peasant Party, and the Union of Labor. Supporters of those parties which did manage to get into the parliament, but with fewer seats than had been expected, as well as supporters of those parties which definitely failed, would like to see another election much earlier. Even three years from now is regarded by them as too far ahead—more frequently they suggest having early elections in a year or two.

But most of those polled regard spring of next year as too soon. That kind of date is favored by every other voter for the Coalition for the Republic (of Jan Olszewski), by every fifth voter for "Solidarity" and for the Center Accord, by every seventh voter for the Confederation for an Independent Poland and the former "Motherland" coalition, and by every ninth voter for the Liberal-Democratic Congress [KLD]. KLD's electorate is also most convinced about the necessity of observing the election time schedule, from among all the "loser" parties. Half of the September-election KLD voters, spoke in favor of having elections as far ahead as in four years.

Let us recall that 35 percent of the Polish people researched by PBS were happy with the election results, 26 percent were worried by them, while 39 percent regarded then as irrelevant.

Every fifth person researched by PBS refused to answer the question about whether the parliament formed in the aftermath of the 19 September elections will survive the "legally provided" four years. Problems with expressing their views were exhibited first of all by housewives, schoolchildren, and university students. From the remaining social and professional groups, the biggest group (34 percent), predicts a full term. The group largely consists of people with higher education, with the highest incomes, as well as supporters of the parties currently in parliament. Regardless of education, income levels, occupation, or political views, there are few people who say that the parliament will only survive a few months, that is to say till spring of next year. That particular view is shared mainly by private entrepreneurs, the unemployed, and "Solidarity" voters.

The poll of 16-17 October, was conducted on a 1,068-person sample representative of the country's adult population.

[Accompanying the text, is a pie-chart showing results regarding one of the questions asked during the poll: "When should the next elections take place?" The results are:

51 percent—"In four years"

18 percent—"It is hard to say"

11 percent—"In a year"

9 percent—"In two years"

6 percent—"In the spring"

5 percent—"In three years"]

Serb Danube Blockade Causes 'Alarming' Damage

AU1711201693 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1800 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] In connection with the Romanian ships, which are blocked on the Danube, Engineer Bone Stan, general director of the Giurgiunav company SA, stated to our reporter, Doru Dinu Glavan, that the ship Tecuci was freed from its initial blockage and is now on its way to Hungary and then Austria, the destination of the 5,100 tonnes of sugar that it is transporting.

On the other hand, the second Romanian ship—Bocsa IV—has been blocked in the Belgrade area by the non-governmental organizations White Rose and New Byzantium; it is carrying a cargo of sugar and is in transit from Romania to Ukraine.

The severe winter, especially in Yugoslavia, creates difficult conditions for the Romanian ship. At the same time, expenses needed for the maintenance of the ship, which has cast anchor in the middle of the Danube, are increasing and there is a considerable delay in the delivery of the commodity to the foreign partner, something that has caused damages amounting to alarming sums of money so far, the general director of the Giurgiunav company SA also said.

Opposition Calls for Setting Up New Government

AU1711181693 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1634 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 17/11/1993—Leaders of the Civic Alliance Party, the Democratic Party, Romanian Ecological Party, Liberal Party '93, National Liberal Party-Democratic Convention, Christian Democratic National Peasant Party, Romanian Social Democratic Party and the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania signed a declaration speaking up for the formation of a new government.

Stressing that "the current rulers have not kept their promises, the prices are spiralling, salaries do not cope with expenditures, social injustice is affecting more and more people," the declaration released in bucharest on November 17 reads: "The way out of this crisis is the political solution of changing the government."

"No artificial, propaganda-like formula, like the so-called Consultative Council on Economic and Social Affairs of the Presidency can settle the crisis, it can only deceive the citizens," the declaration reads.

Pointing out that "the parties of the democratic opposition, solid through the joint governing pact, are ready to do their duty to the country," they express the hope that "a new government could rekindle a hope that can be accomplished, could achieve social peace in quiet and stability, based on a national pact with the trade unions."

Foreign Ministry Spokesman Briefs Press

AU1711174893 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1531 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 17/11/1993—Foreign Ministry Spokesman Mircea Geoana told a news conference on November 17 that Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, would pay an official visit to Bucharest, over November 22-24, 1993, as guest of President Ion Iliescu. They will analyze the evolution of the bilateral relations after the Romanian president's visit to Zagreb earlier this year and some international issues, especially ways of political settlement of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.

Geoana also announced that Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu would receive on November 19 Peter Leuprecht, assistant secretary-general of the Council Of Europe, who would chair, together with Karen Fogg, head of the European Union Mission in Bucharest, the conference entitled "Let Us Build a Bridge Toward a Culture of Peace in Europe." The Romanian chief diplomat would also receive Joaquim Fernando Nogueira, minister of national defence of the Republic of Portugal, who would pay a visit to Romania over November 23-25, 1993, the Foreign Ministry spokesman said.

He also announced that a Brazilian delegation, headed by the chief of Europe Department of Brazil's Foreign Affairs Ministry, would pay a visit to Romania over November 22-24. Consultations would be conducted at a secretary of state level between the two ministries and the 12th session of the Joint Inter-Government Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation would be held. Geoana said a memorandum of understanding was expected to be signed on establishing a mechanism of consultations between the two countries' foreign ministries, the new trade agreement would be initialed and the protocol of the joint commission signed.

A forum of Romanian businessmen living abroad will take place in Bucharest, on November 29-30. Foreign Ministry Spokesman Mircea Geoana told the news conference that the meeting, organized upon the Foreign Ministry's initiative, was prompted by the interest and wish shown by Romanian citizens and people of Romanian extraction with preoccupations in the economic, financial, banking, tourism and insurance domains to get to know on the spot the legislative and organizational framework, the restructuring programs, the potential and requirements of the Romanian economy, in the current stage of transition, to single out and establish partnership with institutions, enterprises and companies in Romania.

In the years that have elapsed since the December 1989 revolution Romanian Diaspora has had several meetings in Romania, most of them by domains of activity. A congress of Romanian spirituality was held last October in Herculane, a meeting of Romanian medical doctors from everywhere took place in Bucharest a few days ago,

and Sibiu city will play host at the end of November to Romanian historians from Diaspora who will debate matters of cultural and historical unity of the Romanians and will attend the events celebrating the national day of Romania—December 1. This is an important day in the Romanians' history, the symbol of the big union—the reintegration of the national Romanian state, through the union of Transylvania, Bessarabia, and Bukovina—Romanian provinces kept under foreign occupation by that time—with the Kingdom of Romania.

Delegation, IMF Experts Reach Agreement

AU1811080893 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0924 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Washington, ROMPRES, 17/11/1993—A Romanian delegation formed of Mircea Cosea, state minister and head of the Council for Economic Coordination, Strategy and Reform, Florin Georgescu, minister of finance, and Mugur Isarescu, governor of the Romanian National Bank, met with IMF Director General Michel Camdessus, and with experts of the International Monetary Fund to discuss the contents of the Romanian economic programme to be supported by IMF. The Romanian delegation and the IMF team have reached a mutual agreement on the principles of such an economic programme.

Basically, the programme will promote restrictive fiscal and monetary policies.

Over the following weeks several technical IMF missions, among which one will deal with specific welfare policies, will come to Bucharest to tackle the programme in detail for its further incorporation in the final economic programme memorandum to be completed in December this year. The memorandum and the main draft laws supporting it are to be presented to the Romanian Parliament and submitted at the right moment to the IMF board for final approval.

Cosea Comments on Talks

AU1811081893 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1800 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] The stand-by accord with the IMF will be ready in December, said State Minister Mircea Cosea, president of the Council for Coordination, Strategy, and Economic Reform, on returning to Bucharest today. He had led the Romanian Government delegation in negotiations with the IMF. The hard currency policy will be regulated by switching to market relations in April 1994.

During the discussions with the IMF, it was decided that an IMF technical mission should arrive in Romania on 29 November to update statistics on the Romanian economy for September and to date, in order for them to be included in the memorandum.

This will be accomplished around 4-5 December. The letter of intent will be signed in Bucharest, possibly by the executive director in charge of European affairs within the IMF. After the signing of the letter in question, funds will be received as soon as the financial aid is made available by the World Bank.

It is planned to submit the memorandum to parliament before the beginning of the parliamentary vacation, something that would speed up the availability of the money. The IMF sums of money total approximately $400-500 million, to which the financial assistance by the Group of the 24 will be added.

Mr. Cosea emphasized that what are of importance, however, are the sums of money from the World Bank, which total almost $1 billion and which represent the development programs of the Romanian economy, of reactivating some of its branches, and of developing privatization.

In turn, Mr. Florin Georgescu, minister of finance, emphasized that, during the discussions with the leadership and representatives of the IMF, agreement was actually reached on all principles, stages, and measures for legal amendments that have to be taken immediately, so that we may finalize all these technical procedures with the IMF representatives in a relatively short time, and so that we may have access to international finances at the beginning of next year in order to ensure our financial resources, which will enable us to continue the reform process.

Mr. Mugur Isarescu, National Bank governor, said that the accord with the IMF will give an impetus to the economic reform process and will substantially help diminish the inflation and ensure the stabilization of the exchange rate of the leu.

Article Urges Anti-Inflation Measures

AU1811125993 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0842 GMT 18 Nov 93

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 18/11/1993—It is not the balance of the leu against the dollar that is important, but its stability on an as long as possible term, reads an article in the daily COTIDIANUL, showing that real measures of economic reform must be taken to fight inflation.

Under the current circumstances of increased uncertainty, when the dollar sells by 1,070 lei, while tomorrow it may turn to 1,100 or 1,200 lei, it is hard to make as close as possible forecasts or to plan business operations, reads the article.

Price stability, be it on a medium-term (half an year, for example), can enable a more precise assessment of the true situation in the economy, due to which pertinent decisions can be taken to restructure and adjust the economic system if no subsidies are made and the prices are liberalized.

If the dollar strikes 2,000 lei, but it succeeds in getting stable around this figure, it would be not as bad as if it grew daily. Such an exchange rate shows, however, that

inflation has reached peak figures. But inflation is not a deadly disease if it is treated in time.

Any anti-inflationist measure Romania is to take strictly through the monetary or fiscal instruments is doomed to failure if it is not followed by changes in the productive sector of the economy, shows the article. Keeping the subsidies system (hidden also by artificially low exchange rates), non-profitable enterprises would further have inputs exceeding outputs. If unemployment is still to be considered, the sole criteria of a market-based economy, that of efficiency, will be eluded, while the scarce profits made by the profitable companies will lower and be reused to meet false social interests.

It is here that political interests are becoming involved, to which unemployment and a slowing down in the process of reform are to be added. It is easy to notice that economic reform programmes in Romania are still in a stage of drafts. If the leu is left to fluctuate freely, it will gain stability against the dollar (even if for 2,000 against one dollar). If a stability period is to help the start of reform, the disease will be cured. So, the agony is prolonged, reads the article in the daily COTIDIANUL.

Spiroiu Views Euro-Atlantic Integration

AU1711204793 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1800 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] The National Consultative Council for Euro-Atlantic Integration held its first meeting at the Senate headquarters this evening. The meeting was attended by presidents and other representatives of the parliamentary political parties, the president of the Defense Commission of the Chamber of Deputies, Senate president Oliviu Gherman, military attaches of West European countries that are members of the Atlantic structures, representatives of the presidency, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, other guests, and journalists.

Opening the meeting, Colonel General Niculae Spiroiu, minister of national defense, read a paper on The Military Dimension of Romania's Integration into the Euro-Atlantic Structures. In this context, the proposal was made to formulate a general political strategy on Romania's integration in the Euro-Atlantic security structures, so that all activities that will be undertaken in this area may be correlated and that they may bring about a more rapid integration into these structures, along with preserving the stability and security in our geopolitical zone.

During the discussions that followed the paper by the minister of national defense, speakers raised the problem of accelerating the discussion of the set of laws on national defense and of granting, on the basis of the new budget law, of the funds needed for beginning the process of equipping the army with weapons similar to those the armies of NATO member countries have.

Our reporter, Victor Spirache, also informed us that, at this time, the members of the National Consultative Council for Euro-Atlantic integration is to adopt the text of a statement.

Karadzic Cited on Muslim Use of Humanitarian Aid

LD1711164193 Pale Radio-Televizija Republike Srpske Studio-S Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Passages within quotation marks are recorded]

[Text] A day before tomorrow's meeting in Geneva, republic of Srpska President Radovan Karadzic held a news conference which was predominantly devoted to the topics in connection with humanitarian situation on the territory of former Bosnia-Herzegovina. Here's a report by Mladen Krsmanovic:

[Krsmanovic] Stressing that the Serb side has again, as always before, readily accepted participation in all actions and initiatives which would lead to more favorable conditions for the maximum possible avoidance of suffering by the civilian population, republic of Srpska President Radovan Karadzic today told journalists that the very fact that the meeting [in Geneva tomorrow] has been organized at Sadako Ogata's initiative means that humanitarian issues and all aspects of their resolution are the focus of attention. All this should not have happened, because this is taking place as a consequence of circumstances.

[Karadzic] "Had the peace been signed, this meeting would not have been necessary. However, right from the start the Serb side has been the most cooperative side regarding the humanitarian situation, and we did not wish to lose this opportunity to gain an insight into the needs of the civilian population—the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims—and make our contribution to the resolution of humanitarian issues this winter in the best possible way."

[Krsmanovic] Commenting on the departure of Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic—i.e., Alija Izetbegovic's absence from tomorrow's meeting in Geneva—the president of the republic of Srpska said:

[Karadzic] "Unfortunately, Izetbegovic is not going to attend, and we do not know whether this is his attitude toward this problem or if he is unable to attend for another technical reason. I think it would be right and proper for all those invited to attend. Our delegation is made up of Mr. Krajisnik [Serb republic assembly president] and General Mladic [commander in chief of the republic of Srpska army]. We attach great importance to this problem, although the Serbs are those least in the need of humanitarian aid. The Serbs are receiving a minimal quantity of humanitarian aid, approximately 11 percent of the overall quantity of humanitarian aid.

"However, we are seriously preparing ourselves for peace, and we believe that all the sides ought to make maximum efforts. The Muslim side obviously underestimates this, although this could be regarded as tactics, their strategy, because the Muslim side has been abusing the suffering of the population. Often in Sarajevo the citizens suffered much more than necessary, because the suffering of the people has been used as a weapon of manipulation in the hands of the Muslim leadership."

[Krsmanovic] The problem of supplying the population in the Muslim-held parts of Bosnia is not only a problem of corridors. The widely known fact that humanitarian aid has been abused by the Muslim side and has been reduced to logistic supplies for Izetbegovic's army, whereby the hardest affected are those who the aid is intended for, the civilian population, is not unknown to the Serb delegation either. The president of the republic of Srpska commented on these facts in the following way:

[Karadzic] "Unfortunately, there is a much chaos and anarchy in the Muslim part of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The largest part of humanitarian aid is used to feed the Muslim army. The remainder of the food is used for blackmarketeering by Muslim gangs. What is distributed to the population free of charge is very little. It is particularly the Serbs in Muslim enclaves, under Muslim occupation, that have not been receiving enough food. But this is a problem for the international institutions to severely warn the Muslim side and to condition the dispatch of humanitarian aid by its proper distribution to those whom the aid is intended for."

[Krsmanovic] We are ready to participate in all initiatives conducive to peace and the alleviation of war-inflicted suffering and therefore it would be best to restore peace. But if our readiness to cooperate is further abused, I must say that our patience has its limits, republic of Srpska President Radovan Karadzic said at the news conference today ahead of the meeting in Geneva tomorrow.

Comments on Defining New Aid Routes

AU1711192193 Faris AFP in English 1851 GMT 17 Nov 93

[By Jon Boyle]

[Text] Sarajevo, Nov 17 (AFP)—Top Bosnian political and military leaders were gathering in Geneva Wednesday for talks on relief supplies, as the UN here warned only half the needed winter aid was getting through to Bosnia. Overland convoys into central Bosnia have been suspended by UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali since last month, following the killing of a Danish truck driver near Novi Travnik.

"Since the convoys stopped, probably as much as 70 percent of humanitarian aid has been stopped," said Ray Wilkinson, spokesman for the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) here, "but that's a rough figure."

The UN blamed the attack on the Moslem-dominated Bosnian Army. Around 50 percent of the vital relief supplies needed by 2.74 million Bosnians targetted by the UNHCR were getting through, he said.

Wilkinson's comments came as delegations from the three warring parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina left for a Geneva meeting Thursday called by Sadako Ogata, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, on the aid situation in Bosnia. Aid workers on the ground say the meeting may be the last chance to resolve the convoy issue in Bosnia before winter really bites, with the first falls of snow across Bosnia and plunging temperatures adding a note of urgency to the Geneva talks.

In an interview in his Pale headquarters shortly before leaving for Geneva, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic told AFP the absence of Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic "undermines the importance of humanitarian issues" to be discussed at Geneva. Karadzic, who was to be accompanied at the summit by Bosnian Serb commander General Ratko Mladic, offered to open up more aid routes into Bosnia from Serbia and Bosnian Serb-held territory.

"We are willing to define more than the humanitarian questions, particularly new routes that are going to be more safe and secure," he said, adding that the Serbs would welcome the opportunity for the talks to cover broader issues.

In Sarajevo, a senior government official said Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic and Colonel Stjepan Siber, one of two deputy commanders of Bosnian Army, had left to attend the Geneva meet.

Meanwhile Wilkinson said that "in the whole of Bosnia we will need as much as 50,000 metric tones of food per month to reach the targeted 2.74 million people."

"Thus far the best we have been able to achieve even in moderate weather was slightly over 25,000 tonnes, which was in October, which underscores the enormity of the problem even if the convoys resume." He said Sarajevo needed per week 1,880 tonnes of food and 940 tonnes of non-food relief, but only 1,569 tonnes was being brought in by the airlift operation. "That shortfall could, should be made up by the road convoys or additional airlift capacity," he said.

Four giant Russian-built Ilyushin-76 (eds: correct) planes could fly in 342 tonnes of food a week in 12 shuttle missions, he said, adding that the UNHCR was approaching a number of governments for help, although he declined to name the states involved. He said he hoped the Geneva parley would reduce obstruction of convoys.

"If we can get all of them pulling in tandem at least we should be able to get these interruptions down to a dull roar rather than these widespread attacks, which were increasing at the time," of the suspension of aid, he said.

On Tuesday, Bosnian Croat HVO [Croatian Defense Council] forces refused to allow a seven truck convoy into two hospitals in the Fojnica area, some 45 kilometres (around 30 miles) west of Sarajevo, where Canadian and Danish UN troops are caring for around 600 mentally and physically handicapped children and adults.

Gorazde Appeals for Food; Attacks Noted

AU1811121093 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 18 Nov 93

[Text] As Mustafa Kurtovic reports, the greatest problems in the Gorazde region is food for the local population and the large number of refugees. Not a single convoy has arrived in the town for 15 days. The representatives of the UNHCR and the International Red Cross are justifying this by citing safety reasons. This is why Gorazde is appealing to the relevant institutions in the country to help with the delivery of food to this town.

The Serbian aggressor is constantly provoking the defense lines in the Gorazde area, especially from the direction of Cajnice and Ustipraca. The reconnaissance units of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina have also noticed the concentration of large groups of chetniks in this area.

Gornji Vakuf Sees 'Biggest Offensive in 18 Months'

AU1711175093 Paris AFP in English 1737 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Gornji Vakuf, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Nov 17 (AFP)—Heavy fighting raged Wednesday around the central Bosnian town of Gornji Vakuf as Bosnian Croats backed by Croatian Army troops launched what UN officers called one of their biggest offensives against government forces. The fighting blocked the so called "route diamond," a key road linking central Bosnia with the south.

UN officers said the Bosnian Croats and Croatians were using tanks, mortars and artillery against the Moslem-led troops of the Bosnian Government in an offensive that started on Monday. "It's their biggest offensive in 18 months," said one officer at a base of a British batallion of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) at Gornji Vakuf. "They're throwing everything in there."

One officer said the push did not seem to have gained much ground around the central Bosnian town, the site of much fighting in recent months.

Mostar 'Rocked' by Croat Artillery 17 Nov

LD1711230293 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Mostar was rocked today with explosions from shells fired from the aggressor's positions on the western outskirts of the city. Residential areas in the free areas on the left and right banks [of the Neretva River] in the city were targeted. Dozens of houses disappeared today in clouds of smoke, dust, and fire. According to the Information Service of the 4th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, the Croat aggressor brought in tanks

and howitzers in a number of locations, reinforcing the ranks of the regular Army of Croatia.

'Joint Aggressors' Resume Offensive on Olovo

AU1811114493 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 18 Nov 93

[Report by Velid Djindo from the Olovo press center]

[Text] After a fragile truce this morning, at 1000 the joint aggressors resumed their wide-ranging offensive on the free territory of Olovo and Vares, which started eight days ago. A fierce battle are currently being waged for a strategically important peak of (Maglic). The forces [name indistinct] and the Croatian Defense Council from Vares and Kiseljak are occasionally fiercely shelling the positions of the Olovo defenders in the general region of Bakici, Krusevo, and Kamenjaca. The joint forces of the 2d, 3d, and 6th corps of our army are repelling all aggressors' attacks. The lines are stable.

Combat Situation in Olovo, Vares, Doboj Reported

AU1811115493 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 18 Nov 93

[Text] The cold day and the resolve of the defenders of Bosnia-Herzegovina appear to have cooled the barrels of the aggressor's artillery. The offensive on the Olovo and Vares free territories, which the joint Serbian and the Croatian enemy forces started eight days ago, was stopped with a firm defense by the units of the 2d, 3d, and 6th Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

These areas were attacked by four enemy corps. They were helped by the units of the Croatian Defense Council from Vares and Kakanj. The aggressor's losses in personnel and hardware are great, but the aggressor has nevertheless been seen regrouping its forces and bringing fresh forces and heavy weapons into the sectors of Krusevo, Olovske Luke, and Crna Rijeka. This shows that the Serbian aggressor still has illusions of cutting the road linking central Bosnia and the Tuzla region.

In the Doboj region, the Serbian aggressor is constantly attacking with all types of weapons the defense lines on Putnikovo Brdo and (Ikarusa) and civilian targets. Constant enemy regrouping has also been noticed.

Fojnica Quiet; Shelling of Bugojno Reported

AU1711161293

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1400 GMT on 17 November within its regular 40-minute newscast carries several reports on the fighting in the Republic.

In his report on the situation on the Fojnica front, Edhem Badzak says that "the activity of Boban's extremists and their helpers from Croatia carried out in the Fojnica battlefield have been stopped. The situation in the town itself is being consolidated and the population which was temporarily evacuated due to fierce shelling of Fojnica is starting to come back to their town. In the other regions in the zone covered by the 6th Corps, there are only some sporadic provocations from enemy positions, but there have fortunately been no casualties."

Studio announcer Milorad Filoni says that "after a three-month break, the fighters of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] and the Croatian Army attacked Bugojno today. At about 1030 about 10 long-range artillery shells were launched on Bugojno from the HVO positions on the side of Gornji Vakuf. The general danger alarm was thereby sounded in Bugojno."

Tudjman, Valentic Hold News Conference

LD1711171093 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1902 GMT 16 Nov 93

[News conference by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and Croatian Prime Minister Nikica Valentic with unidentified Croatian reporters at the Presidential Palace in Zagreb on 16 November—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Reporter] Mr. President, in the wake of your peace initiative regarding the resolving of the crisis in the area of the former Yugoslavia several other initiatives have emerged, including the two most significant initiatives—the French-German initiative and the Greek initiative. To what extent do they overlap? When do you expect the peace process to truly break the deadlock, if I can put it this way?

[Tudjman] They overlap in part insomuch as it is obvious that Ministers Kinkel [German foreign minister] and Juppe [French foreign minister] are eager to set something in motion. Greece is interested in particular because it has good relations with Serbia and especially because it has a particular interest, in its capacity as an EC and NATO member, in normalizing relations in this area. As of January it takes over as the EC president in the EC Council of Ministers.

From our point of view neither initiative is fully acceptable. The Juppe-Kinkel proposal is particularly unacceptable as it refers to resolving the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina and a search for a modus vivendi in the UN Protected Area [UNPA] zones. We have let these governments know this view.

We are talking about this with various representatives in the run-up to the conference of European ministers on 22 November. In other words, these ministers are concerned over the possibility of the war spreading across this area, so it is their impression that Croatia might wait for a solution to the UNPA zones and that the main task is to put an end to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

As far as we are concerned, we also believe that the main task is to put an end to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Yet we cannot postpone the resolving of the UNPA zones. This is why we laid on the table such a concrete proposal about resolving of the UNPA zones as well as linking both cases in the interest of peace and creating preconditions for regulating relations in the area of the former Yugoslavia.

[Reporter] Mr. Prime Minister, at a session of the government—shortly after the stabilization program was adopted, it was said that one could expect that old and new hard currency saving accounts would be soon equalized. Malicious commentators would say that this has already been achieved because it is impossible to access the old accounts while the new accounts are not worth much as it is impossible to exchange hard currencies for dinars. For the first time since the launch of the stabilization program the exchange rate for the German Mark on the exchange rate list of the National Bank of Croatia rose slightly today. Does that mean that the Mark's plunge has hit the rock bottom and that we can expect its recovery? Will there be more dinars?

[Valentic] You have actually raised a whole set of questions. It would take an entire program to explain them. First of all, the government vice president has said that if the assumptions set by the stabilization program materialize it is very likely that the old and new hard currency accounts will be equalized.

This is the crucial difference. As for the second part of the question, the exchange rate for the German mark would be about 70,000 [Croatia dinars] were it not for the government's measures. The inflation rate was 40 percent last month while this month it is estimated at about 60 percent—roughly twice the rate of two months ago. Here I am taking this opportunity to say, according to our daily indicators, that the inflation rate will be five or even under five percent this month. This means that inflation will probably be brought down from some 40 percent to four percent this month. [passage omitted]

[Reporter] Mr. President, what do you think about local peace negotiations. Some results have been achieved in the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] Sector East and in the Karlovac area but not in the Okucani area. The end of November is nearing when UNPROFOR performance is due to be assessed. At the same time there are claims that [Croatian] army forces are massing around Sector West.

[Tudjman] Who says that?

[Reporter] The French do.

[Tudjman] Well, local negotiations and ceasefire agreements prove that the implementation of the [Tudjman] peace initiative has begun. The fact that a ceasefire agreement has not been signed in Sector West is very indicative because almost a year ago there were signs that the local population was ready to normalize relations. Therefore, the fact that ceasefires have been signed in some places and not in others is a reflection of turmoil in UN-protected areas between extreme representatives of local Serbs and those who are aware that relations with Croatian authorities must be normalized. Concerning these reports that Croatia is preparing an all-out offensive against protected areas, they are a result of extreme warmongering among the local [Serbian] population and also a consequence of ill-considered and tendentious reports by certain UNPROFOR representatives who would like to justify their existence or present their own views regarding the resolution of problems.

I think that the world and the most responsible people in UNPROFOR have received enough information to know that Croatia wants a political resolution, that we want a peaceful solution. That is why we put forward all those proposals that I presented in my peace initiative. I think that the Serbian acceptance [of the peace initiative] in some areas is also a sign that the Serbian side has

understood that the only way to solve their current crisis is through an effort to accept the Croatian peace initiative to normalize overall Serb-Croat relations. However, the road toward this goal will not be easy at all.

[Reporter] Mr. President, after the talks between Minister of Interior Jarnjak, and [UNPROFOR Commander] General Cot, it was agreed that some Croatian police forces would withdraw from Sector West. UNPROFOR's so-called trial period expires at the end of this month. Does that mean that UNPROFOR will begin completing their tasks in line with Croatia's demands? Speaking about the Ministry of Internal Affairs, could I ask a small sub-question: There are rumors that there will be changes in the ministry's top. Is that true?

[Tudjman] As far as UNPROFOR is concerned, its leadership might invest serious efforts for UNPROFOR to try to complete—in the framework of its current mandate—the tasks for which it is here. However, it is clear that with its present forces and mandate UNPROFOR cannot secure everything that is envisaged for the normalization of relations. For that reason, naturally, the Croatian Government and the [UN] secretary-general will have to review what has been achieved, whether there are guarantees [that it will be achieved], what needs to be done at the end of this month to enable UNPROFOR to survive, what tasks need to be completed at the level of local Serbs and the Croatian Government, and what steps the international community, that is, the Security Council, must take.

Concerning your second question, I have been listening to that for several months. Changes—not only in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but also in other ministries—fall into the domain, I dare say, of psychological warfare against Croatia's democratic authorities, aimed at creating confusion and deception to destabilize the authorities. However, as the overall situation in the past three years has shown, both those who spread such rumors from within and from abroad have failed, and the rumors have no grounds. There are no reasons for any kind of changes in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as far as the ministry's leadership is concerned. [passage omitted]

[Reporter] Mr. President, would you please comment on the recent statement by Italian Foreign Minister Beniamino Andreatta in Trieste, when he asked why the sanctions have been imposed only against the Serbs, and not against Croats as well, and why there is no deadline to lift the sanctions. In connection with that, there was another statement by Mr. Andreatta to the effect that foreign ministers of the European 12 could offer a proposal on the exchange of territory which would involve certain occupied territories in Croatia and in Bosnia to bring the operation to a final conclusion.

[Tudjman] Although we are familiar with Italy's policy on Croatian territory, that statement is surprising, all the more so because Italy accepted Croatia's intention to develop good and friendly relations in all areas.

It was interesting to hear that Italy expressed a slight uneasiness because I did not envisage Italy's participation in my peace initiative. This statement shows that our stand was justified. It cannot be taken as an accident that some Italian generals have said that they advised Serbs on how to capture Zadar, that an Italian senator appeared at the Serbian rebels' assembly [session], that some mayors in exile of Zadar and other towns make statements, and that the Italian military vicar makes statements condemning the entire establishment of the church in Croatia. All this shows the continuation of an irredentist mood in Italy, unfavorable to Croatia and favorably inclined toward Serbia.

The well-known policy from World War I, the well-known flirtation of some Serbian imperialists with Italian imperialists... [pauses] you probably remember, not so long ago, perhaps a year ago, a certain [Dobrica] Cosic [former Yugoslav president] made direct offers, sent an invitation to Italians to such statements [as received]. Therefore, from our point of view, we must note that we face a constant tendency by certain circles in Italy, although this is certainly not the Italian Government's official policy. However, such tendencies exist and we must take them into consideration, especially in connection with our Istria where there is an Italian minority, albeit very small. In that area, however, certain political elements show a very good response to such tendencies.

The statement that sanctions also should be imposed on Croatia is a statement used as a form of pressure on the democratic Croatia, but it seems to me that it has no realistic basis, and that it comes from circles that would like to ease Serbia's position by blaming Croatia for what it is not guilty of, or by creating some kind of balance, of equal responsibility on the part of Croatia and Serbia, especially in connection with the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I believe that such aspirations will remain only individual aspirations, and that it will not receive support in the EU [European Union] and in the international community as a whole.

[Reporter] I would like to add something briefly to a previous question. What is the essence of the Greek initiative? The public is perhaps not sufficiently informed about it.

[Tudjman] I think I have partially answered that question already. Greece is a member of the European Community, EU, and NATO, but it also has problems in relations with Turkey. Greece's position in Europe depends on peace and stability, or instability, of the international order in southeastern Europe and the Balkans. Therefore, regardless of the fact that Greece is traditionally Serbia's friend, it is interested in the normalization of relations in this territory, in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and its intentions are truely to

mediate in the normalization of relations in the interest of Greece, the EC, and NATO.

[Reporter] The idea of swapping territories is seen as resurrecting an issue that has been occupying the Croatian public over the last few months, and is definitely very interesting.

[Tudjman] Well, from the Greek side, no such idea was forwarded.

[Reporter] I meant from the Italian side.

[Tudjman] As for the Italian side, well, if anything like that has been raised, it must be seen as an indication that Italy considers it in its interest to reach agreements with the Serbs at the expense of Croatia. This is precisely what we have no intention of allowing to happen. Croatia will remain an independent factor in this and will have allies both in Europe and the world in defending its standpoints and its legitimate rights.

[Reporter] Mr. President, in your interview for the Belgium newspaper LA CROIX, which I had the opportunity to read today, you said, inter alia, and I quote: If the survival of Croats in Bosnia is threatened—as happened in Vares recently when 20,000 Croats got expelled from the town—or if 70,000 Croats come under threat in Vitez, Zepce, Kiseljak, and Mostar, the Republic of Croatia will be forced to take different but resolute measures to protect the Croats in those areas if its efforts with the help of the international community to this end fail—end quote. Mr. President, don't you think that in the present atmosphere, when the issue of sanctions against Croatia is being raised in various corners, this statement, if quoted correctly, could be interpreted as a sign of Croatia's intention to intervene in Bosnia?

[Tudjman] Of course, some can interpret that part of my interview in that way. What is, however, important here—and I do not know from which context it was taken—is that basically, I stick to what I said. In other words, it is a fact that the Croatian nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was threatened first by an aggression from the Serb side and now, by a Muslim aggression. The Muslim aggression is even on a larger scale than the the aggression from the Serb side. I have some figures here to support this. About 1,300 members of the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] were killed in defending Croat areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina from Serbian aggression. On the other hand, the number of the killed in the current Muslims aggression is two to three times higher. The number of Croats expelled from their homesteads in Herceg-Bosna in the course of both the Serbian and Muslim aggression probably stands at over 200,000.

At the initial stage of the Serbian aggression the expulsion of Croats was on a large scale; about 120,000 people were expelled. As we can see now, however, in the course of the Muslim aggression, Croats are again being expelled on a large scale. Croats were first expelled from Bugojno, then from the area of Travnik, of Kakanj and, in particular, from Gornji Varos—I mean, from Vares. There were cases of expulsions from the area of Gornji Vakuf, but Vares is what matters.

In his latest statement—and not only his statement—Mr. Izetbegovic, in some way, in fact, hints at the desire to continue the war against Croats when he said that the areas captured by the Serbs—Drvar and Banja Luka—could be returned by political means, while other areas could be regained only by military means, that is, by continuing the war against the Croats.

Naturally, Croatia—as the mother country of the Croat nation—has its obligation to defend the Croat nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but Croatia must also take into consideration the fate, not only of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole for both geopolitical and strategic reasons. Croatia must be the master of its destiny, regardless of whether a greater Serbia or an Islamic state, which will oppose Croatia, will be formed there.

For these reasons we have been doing our utmost from the very beginning to set up cooperation with the Muslims and against Serbian aggression and once the war was over... [pauses] well, for several months now there has been no fighting because the Croats have more or less succeeded in warding off the Serbian aggression except in Bosnian Posavina [northern Bosnia]. In other words, we did our utmost to forge friendship and cooperation with the Muslims but, unfortunately, there has not been enough understanding from the Muslim side and, as a result, the Muslim aggression against the Croats continues.

With Izetbegovic we signed not just an agreement on cooperation and on the need to create conditions in which a Bosnian Muslim republic and a Croat republic would cooperate within the union of Bosnia-Herzegovina but we also succeeded in reaching an agreement providing for cooperation between the two republics and their close links with the state of Croatia. This was to guarantee not just friendship between Croats and Muslims in Bosnia and with the state of Croatia but also the safety of the Croats who were to remain as part of their Muslims republic. Unfortunately, the current policy as pursued by extremist Muslim circles places all this in doubt.

In other words, if events unfold in such a way that the survival of the Croatian nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina comes under threat and the entire territory now populated by the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and, by implication, the region of southern Croatia, are threatened as well, Croatia would have to defend its both historical and strategic interests despite the consequences. This is because, as you know, imperialist claims have been made against southern Croatia by both Serbian expansionists—ever since the World War I when they wanted to divide Dalmatia between Italy and Serbia and during the current war when they tried to conquer Dubrovnik and have laid open claims—both the Serbs and now the Muslims—on the lands east of the Neretva

river. Under such circumstances the state of Croatia must assume a realistic attitude to the defense of the Croatian population and of the Croatian state's strategic interests. [passage omitted]

[Reporter] Mr. President, earlier on you spoke about Croatian-Italian relations. In the light of those who have been pressing for a revision of the Osimo Treaty and these current relations between Croatia and Italy can you comment on some statements by IDS [Istrian Democratic Assembly] leaders to the effect that there will be a referendum on Istria. They have mentioned Istrian autonomy, a transborder region. Could you comment on this?

[Tudjman] Well, we have to state that we expected more seriousness on the part of these politicians. The fact that they have raised the question of the Istrian county's autonomy and referendum, demanding that some other areas be incorporated into the Istrian county, not only Opatija but also the islands [islands in the Kvarner Bay] indicates that some people there are indeed unaware how serious these problems they discuss are, including their moves as they have even gone to the Geneva conference on the former Yugoslavia. Their demand for a referendum is an unconstitutional move.

Under our constitution, under our law, a referendum can only be called by municipalities and towns on some individual issues regarding local self-government. Individual counties are not empowered to call a referendum on any issue whatsoever. As far as counties are concerned, a referendum may be called within the framework of the Croatian Assembly's decisions in all of Croatia or in a limited area, or else, it may be called following the president of state, the president of republic's decision on the basis of the government's suggestion.

Hence, these gentlemen who talk about this should know above all that they have to comply with the constitution. Otherwise they will end up on an unconstitutional platform which, understandably, in itself proves that it is not consistent with their statements to the effect, as they say, that they want to see Istria in, that they want to contribute so that Istria is in the framework of an undivided Croatia.

In this respect I believe that most IDS representatives and members do favor a situation in which Istria will develop within the framework of Croatia. By making such statements and taking such steps and by attempting even to internationalize—their visit to the Geneva conference —and by making statements on Istria as a transnational and transregional region, some of its leaders, those individuals, really call into question the good intentions and constructive reasoning behind their relations in Istria's development within the democratic Croatia. [passage omitted]

[Reporter] Mr. Prime Minister, may I put a question regarding international monetary policy. What is happening with the Croatian dinar in Herceg-Bosna? Does someone know how many dinars there are in circulation there? Do we have information on the sum of money in circulation there, and whether and how much impact this sum of dinars in Herceg-Bosna has on the stability of the Croatian dinar in Croatia?

[Valentic] Of course, we are making such analyses, because when working on such an ambitious program it is not unimportant how many Croatian dinars are in circulation, also in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, on the basis of all analyses of the quantity of dinars in circulation there, we can say that it is not such that it can threaten our stabilization program, although nobody knows precisely how many dinars there are. Because the border is very open, we communicate a lot. We have made a considerable contribution to putting that area in order also by new measures by which we prevented illegal trade in cooperation with the government of Herceg-Bosna. We have been monitoring the daily influx of dinars in Croatia. I have to state completely openly that we have been analyzing and monitoring the possible influx of some other kinds of dinars in Croatia, as it is clear that such programs can be destroyed by the enemy in ways well known to us. We are monitoring the movement of the Croatian dinar daily. [passage omitted]

[Reporter] Mr. President, Croatia surely bears huge responsibility for the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly for Herceg-Bosna. I would be interested to hear about the Split talks. Very few details of the talks have reached the public, but it is clear that after these talks, great changes occurred, both in the structure of authorities, i.e. of the government of Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna, and in the situation on battlefields. How satisfied were you with these talks and how much are the positive moves a result of these talks?

[Tudjman] It is obvious that considerable progress has been achieved after the Split talks, because we told our friends in Herceg-Bosna that our efforts and their efforts concerning allowing in humanitarian aid should be better coordinated, with which Minister of Foreign Affairs Mate Granic was particularly involved. We also told them that we bore responsibility before the world, because it is well known that the Croats in Herceg-Bosna would not be able to survive without direct help from the state of Croatia.

Of course, we had to explain to the world that we are only responsible for what is happening to humanitarian convoys on the territory of Croatia, that we cannot bear responsibility for whatever is happening on the territory of Herzegovina and Bosnia as a whole, that we will invest all our influence so that humanitarian convoys run smoothly through the territory of Herceg-Bosna, that international norms are observed, that steps are taken against actions tarnishing the reputation of the Croatian people, such as not falling into the trap of replying to violence and crimes that the Muslims perpetrated in their offensive, in astonishing proportions. There are

around 40 cases of such crimes, and the Croats, out of despair before the Muslim offensive, also committed some crimes.

On our part we said that we were calling on the Croat leadership in Herceg-Bosna in Bosnia-Herzegovina to prevent such crimes, to call those responsible to account. We also tried to show them that, despite all the difficulties that the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina are experiencing, that everything possible ought to be done for better organization of their authorities, for the normalization of life in general, but also for better help to be provided for the Croats living outside the Republic of Herceg-Bosna, as it is called today. On one side the authorities of the Republic of Herceg-Bosna ought to exist, because on the other side there are authorities in Sarajevo that are exclusively the authorities of the Muslim republic, regardless of the fact that they are still called the government or the presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The republic of Srpska exists, and therefore it is necessary for the Croatian authorities on the territory of the republic of Herceg-Bosna to function properly. It is also necessary, however, for the Croats to have their political representation for the entire union of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this regard, steps that mean progress and better cooperation with the legal authorities of the Croatian authorities have been made.

I believe this has already produced certain results in Herceg-Bosna itself and that it has been well received by those international factors which are monitoring this development.

[Reporter] Mr. President, you have already referred to the statement by Izetbegovic—a militant statement. Other statements by the Muslims which openly express the determination of the Muslim leadership to carry on the war, perhaps until [its] extermination, are known. In this same statement, Mr. Izetbegovic says that Bosnia-Herzegovina is no longer possible as the common state of the three nations. He, in practical terms, equates the Croats with ustashas and the Serbs with chetniks, while the Muslims, for him it seems, are saints who are going straight to heaven [dzenet]. How do you assess this?

Is this statement by Izetbegovic playing into the hands of the efforts of Serbia in terms of allowing it to divest itself of the main blame for the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, because the Muslims themselves are characterizing themselves as militant? Or does this statement play into the hands of efforts by Croatia, which has had an incredibly large number of problems—it had to constantly emphasize its guilt in terms of coresponsibility for the alleged breakup of Bosnia-Herzegovina—and how would you link this with the criticism and accusations from the opposition and so-called independent intellectuals, which have been going on until recently, in which it is requested that Croatian policy goes at any price for understanding, cooperation, and a coalition—a necessary coalition—with the Muslims, or with the Muslim republic? Izetbegovic himself is in fact now saying that Bosnia-Herzegovina—i.e. cooperation with ustashas and chetniks—is no longer possible.

[Tudjman] In your question you gave us quite a lecture [laughs], but you did raise important questions that are truly topical. You see, we did not go for achieving cooperation between Croats and Muslims but for achieving a cooperation, which we believed was the only one possible—in other words [cooperation] in the framework of a confederal setup for Bosnia-Herzegovina, i.e. between a Muslim republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina and a Croat republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina. And at the same time we—and I personally—propounded that the survival of Bosnia-Herzegovina was possible only on a confederal basis.

You should remember that I also proposed that the crisis in the former Yugoslavia should be resolved on a confederal basis, not because I was not in favor immediately of an autonomous and independent state of Croatia, but because I believed that in this way the sovereignty of Croatia, in the face of Serbian aspirations to create a greater Serbia after the departure of Tito from the historical scene, could be achieved, to achieve the sovereignty of Croatia but also to avoid war and casualties. The same was true for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Bosnia-Herzegovina could not be maintained as the kind of entity it was. It could only be viable on some kind of confederal basis, because the national contradictions there had even sharper divisions in terms of civilization than in the former Yugoslavia. So for this policy... [pauses] of course, why not, because you have mentioned that some opposition parties hold me responsible. I really do bear full responsibility for wanting the Croatian nation to achieve its sovereignty alongside the former Yugoslavia, if possible in a confederal system. If not then we would achieve full sovereignty outside [this framework]. I considered this to be the case even more so in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

We were for creating cooperation and friendship with the Muslim republic to prevent this tragic position of Croats—who were driven out of their homes first by Serbian aggression and then by Muslim aggression—and on the basis of the reciprocity of the positions of Croats and Muslims and Serbs in all three republics so as to guarantee the personal safety and the national security of Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Unfortunately, Mr. Izetbegovic signed an understanding and an agreement with us on such cooperation on 14 September this year. Two days later, however, he signed an agreement with the Serbs. The statement that he has made now is in fact his view of the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina—his own view of the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina—and of the agreement with the Serbs that the [Bosnia] Serbs immediately be joined to Serbia and that all rights be transferred to the Muslim republic.

Mr. Izetbegovic was perhaps thinking that he could conquer Croatian areas. This is the reason, as I said earlier [in answer] to the question put by Mr Fijacko,

why in this case—if Mr. Izetbegovic, with a section of the extremist Muslim leadership wants to allow the Serbs to join Serbia but wants to conquer the Croatian areas—the Croatian state must open its eyes and adopt stances to protect both the Croatian nation and the strategic interests of the Croatian state.

Consequently, here we face a historic fault-line regarding the future of the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as regarding the borders of the Croatian state—whether these borders of the Croatian state will be viable in the future or whether they will be threatened by either Serbian imperialism or Muslim expansionism and their desire to create an Islamic state at the expense of Croats.

I believe that—regardless of the fact that for various reasons there are those in the world who would want to free Serbia of its responsibility and shift it on to the Croats, too—the world knows what the key problem is, and I believe that it will know that Croatia's borders are not merely Croatia's borders but also the borders of the world's division on this soil [as heard]. As you know, historically, since the Roman empire, Christianity, and so forth and consequently, Croatia will have a sufficient number of allies on its side if it is forced to get involved in a more active way in defending the survival of the Croatian people and protecting its strategic interests [sentence as heard].

[Reporter] Mr. President, some two weeks ago we talked in this same room, there was pretty much the same line-up - about the peace initiative. You have repeatedly said that you are optimistic. I believe that today you are still optimistic. However, does it not seem to you that, notwithstanding the fact that in Croatia some advances have perhaps been made in those partial cease-fire agreements, there is no global agreement as yet, while the latest developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina have seemingly reached a point of no return. How will the crisis, in your analysis, in Bosnia- Herzegovina potentially unfold? Is there anything that can yet be done to prevent this almost inexorable drift toward the war option?

[Tudjman] I am an optimist, though, because of the fact that as regards Serbian-Croatian relations for several months, over six months, there has been no warfare on Bosnia's soil; in addition, there is also what we heard at conferences and recently in public statements, too—in Belgrade statements have been made by Slobodan Milosevic and to a lesser extent by some others to the effect that normalization of relations is a precondition for peace in this area.

In addition to your question I would also like to reply to some criticism aimed at me, including even your newspapers, to the effect that I am perhaps naive as regards President Milosevic's policy. I dare say that I have enough experience as a statesman and historian so I can regard such views as being totally unfounded. Politics is a policy of a real balance of power and interests.

By waging its aggression and by realizing some aims of this aggression, Serbia has ended up in this situation characterized by international isolation while sanctions have resulted in an economic catastrophe. Considering this Serbian question which, they believed, was raised and generated by Tito's federalization of the former Yugoslavia, and the fact that by waging this aggression of theirs against Bosnia-Herzegovina, they have managed to create the Serbian republic and that the world has let them do this—as it has also probably let them do this not just because it is relatively understandable that neither any European country nor the United States wanted to deploy their armies in the struggle against such an uncertain situation created by Serbian aggression as well as by the Muslims' desire to establish an Islamic state [sentence as heard]

Consequently, I do not want to go on into detail, I believe that Serbia's policies have reached a stage when it must accept normalization of relations both in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. These two issues are linked but they are not identical.

The Serbs in Croatia are a minority, an ethnic community, whereas in Bosnia they are like Croats—a constituent people. Within the framework of Bosnia, the Serbs and Croats as well as the Muslims who until recently called themselves Muslims as a nation and now they have renamed themselves as Bosniaks, they have the same right to self-determination. The Serbs in Croatia, in their capacity as a minority, are only entitled to those rights that are stipulated under international conventions and the indisputable recognition of the territorial integrity of Croatia by the UN Security Council and all the world's important factors—they are only entitled to all their human and ethnic rights protected in keeping with international conventions.

Consequently, Serbia's policy has reached such a stage that it is in its interest to seek peace, whereas the Muslims and their war-oriented policy have no future. The Muslims expected direct aid from Muslim countries. As you know, Turkey and other moderate Islamic countries suggested to the Muslims that they should cooperate with Croats, advising them against war. By opting for war they jeopardize their future.

They are influenced by a certain kind of Islamic irrational attitude according to which casualties are not important. What is important is the realization of their aims. They will, however, have no material basis for that. Apart from this, as I have said, if need be Croatia will really make an effort to win Europe and the world over to the defense of the Croatian people's interests in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and of their own strategic interests. It seems to me that this second factor in relation to us, the Muslim factor, will have to give up those war-oriented aspirations and that they will be forced to accept some kind of peace.

They are now striving to expand as much as possible this Islamic, Bosnian state at the expense of Croatian territory. Even in this respect their aspirations must be dashed. This is why I believe that on the whole we can

realistically be optimistic and expect that the war will come to an end and that the UN-protected zones in Croatia will be gradualy resolved along the lines of what has already been initiated. Communications between Velika Kladusa, i.e. western Bosnia, and Croatia straddling Serb territory have already been opened. We have also been conducting direct negotiations on the further opening of communications and normalization of relations in general between the local Serbs and Croatian authorities. Due to its internal situation as well as international circumstances, Serbia will be forced to normalize its relations with Croatia.

You see, we have not mentioned so far, and it should be borne in mind, that this policy of Izetbegovic's has been compromised in public to such an extent these days that people are in fact realizing—all the statesman and diplomats who return from Sarajevo say: When we have talks with individuals from the Muslim leadership, it is like having talks with members of different nations and not the same Muslim leadership.

And their conflict with [western Bosnian leader Fikret] Abdic—Izetbegovic's conflict with Abdic—bears witness in the best way to how he has decided to act in contravention of the agreement with Croats on joint cooperation. After all, it was Mr. Abdic who enjoyed the very great confidence of the Muslim leadership, even though he consistently spoke in favor—both at the conference and otherwise—of friendship and cooperation with Croatia.

So when Izetbegovic's government, Iztbegovic's circle, unleashed war both against Abdic and those Muslims who were for friendship with Croatia—and Abdic is not the only one, there are other prominent people such as engineer Hadziosmanovic and Amin Pohara, etc.—when they turned against these Muslims, too, then they compromised themselves before the world and that is what leads one to conclude that this policy has no prospects and that they will be forced into peace. I hope that this happens in the near future and that this war does not spread in the way these Muslim extremists want.

[Reporter] Two questions for the two presidents [Tudjman and Government President Valentic]. Mr. President, contrary to your optimism, we have to give answers to the questions put in Strasbourg regarding the observance of human rights in Croatia, while Croatian opposition parties keep insisting on their assessment that Croatian foreign policy has not protected the vital interests of the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Optimism versus those issues—and what do you expect from Minister Granic to bring back from New York? [passage omitted] Which is right, the president's optimism or the people's grumbling?

[Tudjman] As regards the president's optimism, it most probably has got some grounds in everything that has been done so far in the establishment of the democratic Croatia and in the establishment of the democratic order in Croatia, which is, I dare say, more stable than in any other post-communist country.

As regards the fact that this policy has led the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina to a catastrophic position, I have already answered that question, and any person with a bit of political sense can judge it for themselves.

We have done everything to protect the Croats on the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina; therefore, we gave our advice to the Croats, and I personally did so, to vote for the independent Bosnia-Herzegovina in the referendum, in order to have the position of the Croats protected throughout Bosnia. It was also clear to us that we could not fight for a unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina in which the Croatian people would be exposed to annihilation, because in that case we could have been satisfied with the former Yugoslavia.

Therefore, my optimism is based on the fact that by pursuing such a policy we managed to establish the independent Croatian state. We managed to protect the vital interests of the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, even though we could not protect their individual and local interests in central Bosnia, but those Croats who survive there will certainly have guaranteed rights on the basis of reciprocity, i.e. those who have been evicted will have their Croatian state.

By pursuing such a policy the borders of the Croatian state will be secured, in the sense that southern Croatia will no longer be endangered either by Serb or Muslim expansionist policies, that the independent Croatian state will be able to defend those borders, and that such a Croatia will have its place within the western world. Because, these borders have neither been in the past nor are they now the borders of Croatia alone. Unfortunately, we are situated at the crossroads of different worlds and civilizations, which is bringing us huge difficulties and problems, but at the same time it has made our survival possible and it will be so in the future, particularly now that we have created our state. [passage omitted]

[Reporter] [passage omitted] What do you think of the statement, following the presidential elections, saying that foreign diplomatic offices would be happier if you had lost the elections?

[Tudjman] Have you finished your question?

[Reporter] I have.

[Tudjman] Many diplomatic offices or individuals in those offices would probably have been happier if someone else had been elected to head the democratic Croatia because—it is no secret—many embassies and many international factors were interested in preserving Yugoslavia as it was, or as reformed by Markovic, at any cost. Some people did not understand that the collapse of socialism, of communist socialism, also meant the collapse of multi-ethnic states in Europe, and that it ushered

in the period in which international order can be built on the national identity of small nations too.

I do not know whether it was a coincidence or by accident—although I do not believe in coincidence—but I wrote about great ideas and small nations 30 years ago. Many people in Croatia's public and political life are obviously inclined—as some people are in other nations too—to being constantly enslaved by new illusions and new deceptions. However, at three elections held since 1990 despite the war, the Croatian nation proved its maturity, the maturity which was fully fledged in Europe following the collapse of multiethnic states and the creation of independent states, while in Croatia this tendency was perhaps more obvious than elsewhere because our democratic system is more stable. But this is why such ideas, which contravene the achieved results, the democratic election results, and the transformations which we have completed, are more evident [sentence as heard].

Ladies and gentlemen, people stood in wonder at how we managed to establish the democratic Croatia, to fight off the aggression by the Yugo-communist army when everyone expected us to be politically and militarily defeated. Some representatives—seeing that you mentioned them—left Zagreb expecting the collapse of the democractic Croatia. This is an indication of the lack of orientation at this historic, critical moment of the collapse of old ideologies and multiethnic states, and some people here are not ready to accept the new state of affairs, and were not ready to learn the necessary lessons and draw conclusions from that.

The democratic Croatia is not only an object of various calculations on the establishment of a new international order in the territory of the former Yugoslavia in this part of southeast Europe and the Balkans, which various powers want to build under their influence; it is also a thorn in the side precisely because it is, headed by its present leaders, the example for many other nations which are only now raising their heads, which gained independence, and—as you can see—their independence has been brought into question not only by the return of the former communists in power, but also by the renewal of the union. Nations broke away from the USSR, and they are now being brought back. There are also nations which have still not achieved full independence and sovereignty.

Therefore, it is thought that Croatia should be pressurized and it should be proved that it should play a part in the game of foreign factors. However, we have achieved a miracle in establishing the democratic system and independence, and also the miracle of which Prime Minister Valentic spoke. Without any financial assistance, without any loans, but with the help of our people in the country—their awarness that they have to contribute to the independent, democratic Croatia—and with the help of almost half of the Croatian nation who are abroad, we managed to overcome economic difficulties and achieve our economic revival, which is in its own way an economic miracle.

Nikica Valentic could tell you how experts from the IMF and from the world's banking circles wondered how it was possible, and could not believe that we were capable of taking such measures in the given circumstances, and that we will succeed. And we will succeed!

People who through their difficult past matured to the point of being able to have their own state, and who proved their maturity in such circumstances, can count on their future. That is our greatest achievement in this critical interim period, and it is normal that we have diverse political views and various parties, little parties, individuals and so on. However, we have become an international factor regardless of the talk that Croatia's reputation is allegedly not as it should be. Croatia is an international factor which is taken into consideration by the most influential political factors in Europe and in the world. The Croatian man and the Croatian nation can be certain of their state's future.

Army Reportedly Mobilizing in Eastern Croatia

LD1711143693 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1248 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Banja Luka, 17 November (TANJUG)—Croatian units are continuing to regroup and bring up fresh forces to several areas, it has been learned at the press center of the [Bosnian Serb] First Krajina Corps in Banja Luka.

Units from Zagreb, Rijeka, and Bjelovar have arrived in the area of eastern Slavonia [eastern Croatia] with artillery which is being concentrated in the region around Zupanja.

North of Daruvar [eastern Croatia] there is a concentration of units from Virovitica and Bjelovar, while around Karlovac there are fresh forces from Rijeka.

Over the past few days there has been a noticeable mobilization of Serbs and Italians in Istria, despite the fact that they have expressed their loyalty and have citizenship documents.

Army Attacks Bosnian Serb Positions

LD1711160693 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1421 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Trebinje, Nov 17 (TANJUG)—Regular army units of the Republic of Croatia grossly violated the ceasefire on Tuesday [16 November], after a three-month interval, firing from anti-aircraft weapons on Bosnian Serb positions, the Bosnian Serb army Herzegovina corps said on Wednesday.

Croatian troops fired from the area of Konavle, about 15 kilometers south of Dubrovnik. Their chief target was

the area of Veliki Steder, a hill in the Trebinje municipality located at a point where the borders of Yugoslavia, Croatia and the Bosnian Serb republic meet.

The Herzegovina corps communique said that Serb troops did not counter-attack and that they had no casualties.

Croatia's regular army units are fighting on the side of the Bosnian Croats in the war-torn former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. At least 50,000 of them have been engaged in Bosnia-Herzegovina since the outbreak of the conflict among the Bosnian Croats, Serbs and Moslems.

Granic: UN, U.S. Welcome Tudjman Initiative

LD1711162293 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Report by correspondent Tihomir Vinkovic; passages within quotation marks are recorded]

[Text] [Vinkovic] Following his return from New York Foreign Minister Granic has met Croatian reporters to inform them about his visit to the United Nations.

[Granic] "The principal aim of my mission was to explain President Tudjman's peace initiative and reflect upon all other peace initiatives, particularly the French-German initiative. UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali is expected to submit his report to the UN Security Council within the next 15 days, something he is obliged to do under UN Security Council Resolution 871. We talked about the current situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly in central Bosnia; about the Croats being under threat in their enclaves in central Bosnia.

"We also talked about our peace efforts and the Sarajevo meeting as well as the next meeting, which will in all probability be held in Zagreb."

[Vinkovic] As for the results of his talks Minister Granic said:

[Granic] "President Tudjman's peace initiative was met with everyone's support. It was primarily perceived as a commitment to peace. As far as the UN Protected Area [UNPA] zones in the Republic of Croatia are concerned, there was a very positive reaction to the fact that a concrete proposal had been put on the table with the Serbians, local Serbians, as well as to the fact that a clear signal had been sent to Belgrade."

[Vinkovic] Concerning views on the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina there are hardly any differences between President Tudjman's initiative and the French-German proposal. The only difference is President Tudjman's demand that force be used against those who will not respect the peace agreement, something that is not envisaged in the Kinkel-Juppe initiative. Croatia raised certain demands regarding UNPROFOR's [UN Protection Forces'] future in Croatia.

[Granic] "We also demanded that UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali's report, which is to be submitted to the UN Security Council, should include certain elements of President Tudjman's peace initiative."

[Vinkovic] One should point out that Croatia's efforts to put an end to the conflict between the Croats and Muslims in central Bosnia were accepted and welcomed by all his partners, Granic said. It is also significant that the United States support Croatia's territorial integrity as well as its demand that sanctions against Serbia be also linked to Serbia's conduct in the UNPA zones in Croatia. In the course of Croatia's diplomatic activities Minister Granic will meet Belgian Minister Willy Claes in Brussels tomorrow. On Friday he will meet German Minister Klaus Kinkel.

U.S. Said To Have Arms Violation Information

LD1711221093 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1448 GMT 16 Nov 93

["Pool" item by Dejan Lukic]

[Text] Washington, Nov 16 (TANJUG)—The U.S. intelligence agency is in possession of detailed information on violations of the arms embargo by the Croatian Government, and Washington has recently on several occasions conveyed "substantial concern" over this offence. The message has been carried without additional warning that something more than a protest might be sent to Zagreb. Asked how can one justify such a passive attitude towards Croatia's violation of the international embargo, the U.S. source told TANJUG correspondent that there everybody buys everything.

According to the source, the State Department and part of Pentagon explain that the administration's "lukewarm" attitude towards bringing in arms into Croatia, but primarily into Bosnia, is on the line still dominant in the circles of U.S. political and military analysts, according to which balancing of military strength is a way to force the three parties to seriously negotiate concessions and settlement.

On Sunday, THE WASHINGTON POST published a report from its Zagreb correspondent John Pomfret on Croatia's ambitious program of arming. According to the report, customs authorities have arrested unnamed Croats in Arizona and Florida who offered on behalf of the Croatian Defence Ministry payment in gold, through private arms dealers, for the shipment (tanks and artillery) mediated by the firm Interaramco of Monaco.

THE WASHINGTON POST said that, according to Western sources, Croatia spent "at least" 400 million dollars for nine MiG aircraft and 50 German-made Leopard tanks, but Washington sources claim, according the U.S. side, that the sum is at least double the amount, that the Croatian side purchased "substantial" quantities of artillery pieces and anti-tank weaponry—partly from United States. Experts confirm that the report by THE WASHINGTON POST is rather up-to-date in the

part which speaks about the balancing of military strength in the Knin Krajina, but that it is neither precise nor does it coincide with the official analyses in Washington, in the part which indicates that the Knin front will be opened shortly.

According to THE WASHINGTON POST, the administration's analysis is that Tudjman will not open a front in Krajina until he sees the outcome of the war in central Bosnia. A further escalation is expected there, coupled with forecasts that Croats will lose the entire central Bosnia, but that the Moslems will not be satisfied with that and that Mostar is in competition for the "Bosnian Stalingrad."

Jarcevic Views 'Unification' of 'Serbian Lands'

AU1811100893 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 17 Nov 93 p 7

[Report by J. Bezbradica: "Unification of Serb Lands"]

[Text] "Last Saturday we held a joint meeting in Banja Luka at which we agreed on a common customs policy and energy systems," [Serb Krajina foreign minister] Slobodan Jarcevic says. "Every citizen of Krajina and the Serb republic, as well as every citizen of Yugoslavia, bar some exceptions, is committed to the unification of all the Serbian lands with the FRY. At the moment it does not matter whether this will be a unitary state, which is what an increasing number of citizens want," Jarcevic says, "or whether it will be a union of all the Serbian lands. Taking into account the enormous international pressure to which Yugoslavia is exposed, I think that its leadership cannot now lead to the unification of all the Serbian lands."

It is necessary to wait, Jarcevic says, for the world powers to realize that "there is nothing unnatural and immoral about the desire of the Serbian people to live in one state."

Last week, during the visit to Knin by Cedric Thornberry, UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] head for civilian affairs, he was given a demand by the Krajina representatives to be received by the UN Secretary General, as they are justifiably suspicious that the reports from the ground get to him either too late or not at all. Slobodan Jarcevic, Krajina foreign affairs minister, addressed this issue, saying that Butrus Butrus-Ghali would have to consider seriously the demand by the Krajina delegation, as it is still uncertain whether the Security Council would extend UNPROFOR's mandate on the territory of Krajina and the Republic of Croatia, and that therefore every piece of information or fact would have a considerable influence on the final decision.

He said that the decision on the UNPROFOR mandate would be made at the end of this month, and would be based on the report presented by UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali. "Our views have to be incorporated into that report, because not to do that would be an expression of unacceptable impertinence toward the interests of the Serbian people in the republic of Serbian Krajina. The attitude of the world toward Croatia is also changing, and it no longer enjoys the rating it had two years ago," Jarcevic says.

"Since it has not yet been established whether the UNPROFOR mandate will be extended and in which form, or whether it will be changed, we will inform the UN Secretary General and the Security Council, and all the countries in the world about our demand in written form," Jarcevic stresses.

Federal

Macedonian Border Patrol Kidnapped

AU1711181893 Skopje MIC in English 17 Nov 93

[Unattributed report: "Incident at Macedonian-Yugoslav Border"]

[Text] The Macedonian Interior Ministry announced that at approximately 1100 a.m. today, five citizens of FRY, of which three in civilian clothes and two in combat uniforms, entered the territory of the Republic of Macedonia in two terrain vehicles Lada Niva (registered in Valjevo and Kraljevo, FRY) near the village of Lojane in the vicinity of Kumanovo.

With two automatic machine guns they attacked and forced the Macedonian patrol made up of two policemen of the Interior Ministry and one soldier of the Macedonian Army to enter their vehicles, following which they were taken to the territory of FR Yugoslavia (Serbia).

According to available information of the Interior Ministry, the policemen and the soldier are detained at the border watchtower of the Yugoslav army in FRY Yugoslavia.

The Interior Ministry announced that cooperation has been established with the authorized ministries of FRY and Serbia, for the full clarification of this entire incident and release of the policemen and the soldier.

Foreign Ministry Protests

LD1711192593 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1823 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Skopje, 17 Nov (TANJUG)—In response to today's incident near the village of Lojane in the area of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] border, which has been described in Skopje as a serious border incident, the Ministry for Foreign Relations of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia lodged a protest this evening with the Foreign Ministry of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

TANJUG was told in the FRY Foreign Ministry that no such protest has been received.

The protest of the ministry in Skopje demands that the members of the Macedonian patrol be immediately released and allowed to return to Macedonia.

The UN Protection Force's representatives in Macedonia have said that they were informed about the incident, but added that this area is not under their competence, but under that of the Macedonian authorities.

Army Staff Comments

LD1811101593 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0919 GMT 18 Nov 93

[Text] Belgrade, 18 Nov (TANJUG)—The information service of the Yugoslav Army General Staff says in a statement issued today that, at approximately 1100 on Wednesday, 17 November 1993, a Yugoslav Army border patrol—acting strictly in accordance with border service regulations—caught and disarmed a Macedonian border patrol on FRY territory in the region of the Miratovac watchtower on the border between the FRY and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

The patrol was made up of two policemen and one soldier armed with two pistols, and one automatic and one semi-automatic rifle. They were also in possession of two radio transmitters. They were captured after they had crossed 150 meters into FRY territory on the old Kumanovo-Vranje road. After they had been interrogated, the captured border guards were returned to the relevant bodies of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia at 1710 on the Cukarka border crossing, the statement by the information service of the Yugoslav Army General Staff says.

Policemen, Soldier Released

LD1711204193 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1907 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Excerpt] Skopje, 17 Nov (TANJUG)—All three members of the border patrol of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, who were taken this morning to a Yugoslav army watchtower south of Presevo have been released, the Macedonian Ministry of Internal Affairs announced this evening.

Two Macedonian policemen and one Macedonian army soldier are currently in the police station in Kumanovo.

It has also been announced in Skopje that the Lada Niva vehicles in which the members of the Macedonian border patrol were taken to the watchtower had registration plates from Valjevo and Kraljevo. [passage omitted]

Serbia

Socialist Party Holds News Conference

AU1711212693 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Report by Zoran Lukovic]

[Excerpts] [Begin recording] [Lukovic] The campaign for the forthcoming elections has already started and the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] will conduct it in accordance with the times and circumstances. Regarding other parties, everybody will set standards for themselves while the citizens and the voters will either show or not show trust in them, Zoran Arandjelovic, chief of the SPS electoral headquarters, thinks.

Not even the best political marketing, regardless of how expensive it many be, can replace the entire work of a party, SPS spokesman Ivica Dacic believes. He described the references of some parties to unequal conditions as an attempt to search for an alibi for poor electoral results in advance. Everything that is written in the media regulations will be observed, he said.

From their answers to journalists' questions we single out what did not refer directly to the elections but was not completely separate either. Regarding the situation in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina and the views of Franjo Tudjman, Zoran Arandjelovic says:

[Arandjelovic] Let those who have so far stalled the peace process in Bosnia find a way out of their troubles and problems themselves. The Serbs who have accomplished certain goals there, Serbia, and our party— that is, the SPS which has been working to restore peace in Bosnia as quickly as possible since the beginning—are the only ones who have not changed the policy toward this issue.

[Lukic] Asked to comment on the measures of the governments and the social situation, SPS spokesman Ivica Dacic put forward the following assessment:

[Dacic] The curbing of hyperinflation, resolution of the grave economic and social situation in which the residents of Serbia live, and protection of the standard of living of the most endangered classes of citizens. We support all measures that are geared toward these aims, but concrete mechanisms for the realization of these measures are not a matter of a political party but a matter of the executive organs, that is, the governments.

[Lukic] [passage omitted] At the SPS news conference the journalists were also told that this party, due to lack of technical and other conditions, will not opt for the presence of large numbers of citizens in one place during the electoral campaign. [end recording]

Communists Plan To Take Part in Elections

AU1711153993 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Excerpt] The League of Communists—Movement for Yugoslavia held a news conference. The united left, which, in addition to this party, also includes the Union of Workers of Serbia [Savez Radnika Srbije], the National Front, and the League of Youth—Movement for Yugoslavia [Omladinski Savez—Pokret za Jugoslaviju], represents a new political force that is entering the political arena today. This was stressed by Professor Dragomir Draskovic, president of the League of Communists—Movement for Yugoslavia. The news conference was announced as a promotion rally. Vladimir Nikolic reports:

[Nikolic] The united left as a political force will strive for peace, as a precondition of everything, and for changes in the position of the poor. It will fight against war profiteers and for improvements in the position of the workers, increase in production, and free education and medical care. Pensioners deserve not only a better treatment but also a decent and dignified material position. This was stated by Professor Draskovic, adding that the united left believes that the position of agricultural producers can also be radically changed.

[Draskovic] The united left will take part in the elections and is not setting any conditions [words indistinct] with a profound belief that the elections will be democratic and that they will reveal not only spiritual capabilities of Serbia but also that democracy is possible and does exist on the political scene in Serbia. [passage omitted]

Power Engineering Industry Under Pressure

AU1711164793 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 16 Nov 93 p 2

[Report by J. Putnikovic: "The Rainy Collapse of the Power System"]

[Excerpts] Belgrade—The gale and icy rain that paralyzed traffic and all other vital services in Serbia last weekend also confirmed that the authorities' promises that heating over the oncoming winter will be solved satisfactorily were only empty words. Sitting by their lukewarm radiators, citizens used their electric heaters unsparingly. So, 106 million kWh was used on Saturday and 108 million kWh on Sunday. The Serbian Electricity Board claims that 110 million kWh were generated on both days and that the supply "covered" consumption. However, the consumption of a larger amount of power resulted in a reduction of voltage in the electric power system that, in turn, made lightbulbs "flicker," while television sets could not work without special power stabilizers. [passage omitted]

The extent of power consumption last weekend is best illustrated by the fact that in the same period last year, when the lack of fuel also led to increase in power consumption, the daily consumption was 82 million kWh. The poor supply of power was blamed on the lack of rain and low levels in accumulation lakes. However, one should recall that last January, during the peak consumption period, Serbia was using 117 million kWh and that there were even restrictions in supply. It would be interesting to see how much power the Serbian power engineering industry would be able to produce now, without running a risk of completely emptying accumulation lakes.

More Illness Expected in Belgrade This Winter

AU1711214093 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 17 Nov 93 p 21

[Unattributed report: "A Risky Winter Coming"]

[Text] The city Institute for Health Protection predicts the number of cases of respiratory complaints to increase in the coming winter due to inadequate clothing and

reduced heating. This is said in the report that the institute prepared in cooperation with the city Health Secretariat for today's meeting of the Belgrade Assembly Executive Committee.

During the coming winter, due to the appearance of a new type of influenza virus one can expect an increased number of flu cases particularly among school and preschool children, as well as an increased number of cases of pneumonia among the so-called high-risk groups (old people, people suffering from chronic illnesses, etc.).

An increased number of cases of streptococcal infections is expected in Belgrade due to overcrowded schools and hostels, as well as an increased number of cases of food poisoning because systematic control of production, transport, and storage of food has been stopped.

This picture is made more complete by the Institute for Health Protection which provided data about a general decrease of resistance among the population of the capital city due to malnourishment.

One should add here also the reduced use of health protection, lack of diagnostic means, difficulties in importing vaccines, and problems in carrying out disinfection, insect control, and extermination of rats, it is said in the announcement.

The city Institute for Health Protection says that, among other things, there has been an upsurge in the number of cases of mental and contagious diseases, as well as the cases of "insufficiently defined conditions."

Last year, violent deaths (accidents, murders, suicides) have gone up on the list of most frequent causes of death to the fourth place.

Measures to improve the situation proposed to the city authorities include the advice to the Republican Health Insurance Institute to approve of or increase resources aimed at various forms of health protection, as well as suggestions to various inspectorates (sanitary, ecological, communal) to increase activities in the spheres of their responsibility.

Directors of health institutions and hostels are being obligated to ensure priority in obtaining food and means of hygiene for children and other most threatened categories of population and health institutions are obliged to make the registration and reporting on some diseases much stricter.

Macedonia

Parliament Holds Extraordinary Session

AU1711121393 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 16 Nov 93 p 3

[Report by K. Cangova, Z. Petrov: "Two Different Viewpoints on the Damage Caused by the Affair"]

[Text] Yesterday's parliamentary session began with justification of the request for a vote of no confidence in the government, put forward by Tomislav Stevkovski, coordinator of the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Movement for Macedonian National Unity] delegates group. In the justification it was stated that, so far, the government had not taken the necessary measures and or done enough to protect the security of the Macedonian state and citizens. Then, regarding the latest arms smuggling affair and the attempt to create paramilitary formations, Stevkovski argued that responsibility for the penetration of the Defense Ministry by foreign intelligence services through the politically oriented Deputy Minister Husein Haskaj, member of the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity], falls squarely on the government. The government's attempts to conceal the affair, and thus protect its coalition partner—the PDP, Stevkovski pointed out, is further proof of its lack of feeling in protecting the vital interests of the Macedonian state. The professional engagement of members of the Interior Ministry is not at all a justification for the behavior of the government, which wanted to minimize the event and thus conceal from the public the dimensions and consequences of the creation of the paramilitary formations by extremists from the Albanian national minority.

According to VMRO-DPMNE, the government has contributed to the destabilization of the Republic of Macedonia, but it has also created a feeling of insecurity among its citizens. Moreover, Stevkovski talked about the government's inefficiency in the current period of office, and mentioned "the historic theft of the citizens' currency deposits, the erosion and theft of the social capital and its illegal flow into private hands, and the plundering of the social capital by omitting taxes and allowances." The government was also blamed for the low standard of living, the increase in social tensions, inadequate and nonselective budgetary consumption, a credit and monetary policy that contributed to increasing inflation, the absence of a current and future economic policy, the lack of the promulgation of a system of laws necessary for the final formation of the state....

"Ilirida"—A State Within a State

Dosta Dimovska, VMRO-DPMNE, repeated the substance of the justification when she quoted several statements by PDP leaders regarding the establishment of the independent formation known as "Ilirida," which implied the formation of a state within a state. Dimovska called on Prime Minister Crvenkovski to resign so as to protect his dignity. The VMRO-DPMNE had been constantly pointing out the situation in Macedonia, in which the interests of several neighboring countries were intermingled, Aleksandar Florovski of the same party said. He accused government officials of bribery, violation of the embargo, various speculations with private companies, renting offices, and so on. In his well-known rhetorical style, Florovski emphasized that as a result of all this the government had lost credibility,

particularly considering that some of its ministers—Albanians—had been involved in the latest affair. He asked about the whereabouts of Deputy Health Minister Imer Imeri, who is suspected of diverting part of the humanitarian aid to the Albanian illegal organization.

Dusan Trpcevski, VMRO-DPMNE, found the whole problem of the involvement of government officials in the latest affair to fall within the framework of the attempt to create paramilitary formations. He considered the events in Gjorce Petrov and the decision of the Macedonian Constitutional Court as a good reason, as he said, for the government to have resigned a long time ago. Contrary to their statements, Muhamed Halili, coordinator of the PDP delegates' group, tried to draw parallels between the policies of Bulgaria and Serbia in relation to Macedonia and the actions of the VMRO-DPMNE inside the country. He said it was an organized undertaking of the Bulgarian intelligence service, transferred to Serbia, and here interpreted in the VMRO-DPMNE style, and then added it was an attempt to create the impression among the citizens that this party had great political power. Speaking about the latest affair, Halili emphasized that there have been such attempts to create paramilitary formations before on the part of the VMRO-DPMNE (Crnomarov and Golubovski), the only difference being that this specific event was used to portray the PDP as the enemy of the state. According to Halili, it coincided with sentiments expressed by Milosevic and his Greek colleague, Papulias. After the mentioning of names of foreign statesmen, Tasko Kirov of the VMRO- DPMNE reacted by saying that the objectivity of the session had to be maintained, for which he got support from parliament chairman Stojan Andov. Biljana Lazarevska, VMRO-DPMNE, referred to the statement made by Minister Frckovski and said that her party had not been made ridiculous; it was the minister who has been making himself ridiculous in the news conference up to today, especially because his counterarguments were the uncovered invoices for consumed electricity and rent. Regarding the statements of Frckovski that the opposition was opposed to coexistence, Lazarevska said that the VMRO-DPMNE is in favor of coexistence, but it was endeavoring to throw light on an affair that did not seem to be causing any concern at all within the government.

In his statement, Niko Anastasovski of VMRO-Patriotic said that the state cannot be created by misinformers and careerists, but only by joint efforts. He appealed for real unity among the citizens of the republic, and he also demanded that the Interior Ministry submit a fuller report on the latest arms smuggling affair to a closed session of parliament. Saban Prevala, PDP, expressed deep dissatisfaction that in such difficult situation valuable time was being lost in marketing and airing personal views on issues that fall within the competence of the highest state bodies.

Therefore, he said, attempts to overthrow the government lost value because they were made in the sense of a showdown, and the opposition was in a showdown with the government and the PDP. It was a simple case of arms smuggling, Prevala underlined, and that was something that had also happened in the past. It was true that some of those arrested were PDP members, he pointed out, but the party dissociated itself from their activities. The session was not intended to decide whether the government would resign or not, whether the coalition would be broken apart or not, but it was supposed to give answers to some questions—was there a state respecting the laws, was the constitutional order endangered, Blagoj Nandjiski of the SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia] stated, adding that there had been no answer on whether the state was capable of solving the problems on its own or not. Therefore, Handjiski said, the delegates should place the interests of the state before personal and party interests. It was true that difficulties had been encountered in trying to transform the system, he pointed out, but it was also a fact that we were solving them with our own forces. In the latest incident the police had demonstrated their ability to master their tasks. Handjiski emphasized that the damage resulting from the destabilization of our state could be fatal for all of us, and the damage caused by the overthrow of the government would be particularly dangerous.

There Is No Dissociation From Events

When the government was elected, I knew there were moderate people in it, Ismet Ramadani, PDP, said, adding that he also knew that in such political constellations the government would have problems functioning. The government found itself in the clinch of two countries, north and south, which aspire toward oppressing Macedonia; the government was, however, functioning through "artificial respiration," through two semi-open valves—Albania and Bulgaria, Ramadani emphasized. The affair in question was characteristic because of the fact that the Interior Ministry was not the first to give its estimates; the first to speak came from the bloc of Macedonian national parties, and they did so in a merciless and crude way, Ramadani noticed. In these conditions, it was difficult for the government to meet the diametrically opposite requests made by the PDP and the VMRO-DPMNE. However it was unable to act with greater consistency and differentiations concerning the requests made by the parliamentarian groups, he emphasized. Vladimir Golubovski, VMRO-DP [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Movement], retorted that it was natural to want to establish responsibility after such an affair. "I do not see why you take the floor to debate an issue and yet have not the strength to dissociate yourself from the event that disrupted the whole state," he told the PDP delegates. This initiative, put forward by the VMRO-DPMNE, was a continuation of the old policy toward the Albanians in Macedonia, according to Hisni Sakiri, PDP. In his view the arrests by the Interior Ministry were a purely political and tactical action; it was a staged process, with the aim of reassuring Belgrade that Macedonia can cope with the Albanians. Kiril Kovacevski, VMRO-DPMNE, said that he was not convinced by the affirmation that

the PDP was not behind the latest affair in which the police arrested persons who acted against the state order of Macedonia. He accused Minister Frckovski of concealing the facts, because, as he emphasized, not just 30 automatic rifles were discovered in the police action, but the real number was between 300 and 400, and he was also amazed by the interior minister's statement that the group had been followed for the last two years, during which period Haskaj had been permitted to become assistant defense minister. Kovacevski put several direct questions to the government, like: in whose service were the paramilitary formations, who were the discovered arms dedicated to, and could all this be regarded separately from the PDP when all the arrested are members or high officials of that party.

Paramilitary Formations for Liquidation

The same and more questions were asked by Petre Trajkoski, VMRO-DPMNE, accusing the PDP coordinator of deliberately bypassing the discussion in the sphere of education, neglecting the illegal import of arms and the attempt to create parallel military organizations. The assertion that the detected group intended to liquidate the Macedonians in western Macedonia was a monstrous statement aiming to provoke ethnic unrest, according to Djelil Tairi, PDP.

In the name of the VMRO-DP, Vladimir Golubovski accused the government of inciting a plot against the Republic of Macedonia. Regarding the government's record, he said that the economy was blocked, corruption had increased, there was more poverty and the level at which civil rights were realized was low. Golubovski said it was essential to vote for no confidence in the government, to hold new elections, and to call on all Macedonian parties to declare whether they are in favor of new elections or for the formation of a new political government that would deport all disloyal Albanians and suspend the one-nation assemblies in Tetovo and Gostivar, reexamining the census for obtaining citizenship, suggesting 30 instead of 15 years [of residence in the state]. Ljupco Popovski, coordinator of the SDSM, recalled his party's positions and said that the state could only be developed in conditions of peace. Regarding the question of security, integrity, and sovereignty of the state, there could be no compromises and concessions, Popovski said, regardless of the coalition partners. It had to be clear that neither the Macedonian nor the Albanian question can be solved by ethnic conflict, the SDSM coordinator emphasized, and added that the Albanian nationality should think matters over and avoid influence from foreign states. He said that the latest events should serve as a lesson to all parties, especially the PDP.

Court Trial Transformed Into Witchhunt

Stoile Stojkov, VMRO-DPMNE, noticed that there was a natural coalition in power consisting of the heirs of the former bolshevist party and those who persecuted for separatism in the era of single-mindedness.

He said Minister Frckovski's awareness of Deputy Minister Haskaj's terrorist activities was a criminal offense, and called on the Attorney General to prepare a verbal criminal report because it was said that information about criminal activities had been concealed. The Interior Ministry tried to portray the event as an ordinary case of arms smuggling involving individuals, and not an act of organized extremists, Stojkov emphasized, saying that it was not just a simple case of smuggling but a planned criminal act. Stoile Stojkov also emphasized that the PDP's involvement was obvious, as was poor political judgment when the current government agreed to be a partner of the PDP in power, emphasizing the need for a change of government, which, he said, would be the most natural thing. Bekir Zuta, deputy prime minister, assessed that weaknesses were being sought in order to score points on personal accounts, and he added that the debate went beyond the framework of government versus opposition. As he underlined, the several interpellations against government ministers had not been successful and so now a political moment was being used in an attempt to overthrow the government. An attempt is being made to turn a court trial into a witchhunt, politicizing the problem regardless of the consequences, he underlined. The government had chosen the right way, Zuta said, because it had first collected evidence and then presented the whole case to court, and he also added that the discussion was, in fact, a request for disinformation instead of information, because somebody considered this was the right moment to destabilize Macedonia, which could have a fatal impact on the internal and the external plan. The deputy prime minister emphasized that there was a request to modify the trial and to introduce political subjects to it, which could mean civil war. Nobody was authorized, he said, as an individual or a party, to decide the fate of the citizens in such a way, while in essence it was a matter of a struggle for power.

Fortunately or unfortunately, mathematical calculations lay at the basis of each parliament, VMRO-DPMNE leader Ljupco Georgievski said. This was not a matter of the votes that the opposition could gather for a vote of no confidence in the government, but he emphasized the moral responsibility of the government after such a political scandal. After what had happened last week, the prime minister should resign, which would be the normal procedure in a developed parliamentary system. After that the VMRO-DPMNE president criticized the government on this plan, placing a special emphasis on foreign policy from the aspect of violation of the embargo against Serbia. The money from petrol smuggling goes through private firms owned by the ruling parties, above all the SDSM and the LP [Liberal Party]. Regarding the latest affair, responsibility rests with the government, Georgievski said, and pointed out the coincidence between, on the one hand, the official party positions of the PDP and, on the other, the activities of the Albanian Government in Tirana. He recalled the proclamation of the so-called "Ilirida" republic by a PDP delegate, for which, according to Georgievski, the

PDP was awarded participation in the ruling coalition. He then accused the state president and the government for not dissociating themselves from some PDP acts, as was the case with the illegal referendum, the boycott of the census, and refraining from voting for the Constitution. At the end, in addressing the government ministers, Georgievski said: "I know you will not resign, because you have no sense of shame."

The session lasted until late in the evening and, according to some predictions, Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski was expected to address the session at about 1130 pm, after which it was expected to start voting for confidence to the Government.

[Box, page 3]

Unscrupulous Politicization of the Incident

Replying to accusations that he was deliberately minimizing the whole case, Interior Minister Ljubomir Frckovski said that the action was carried out after a two-year investigation of the people who were arrested the moment sufficient evidence was gathered to support a criminal report. After that, he said, the national opposition found itself in a ridiculous situation, because they were simply unprepared after the Interior Ministry action, which showed that the government institutions were in control of the situation. In these circumstances, however, Frckovski emphasized, the opposition had to say anything, such as, for example, that it had been warning about this for a long time, that coexistence was impossible in Macedonia, and, what was of particular interest, in this incident the Interior Ministry was placed aside from the government, which was being attacked in all possible fields, while at the same time neglecting the debate about the Interior Ministry that took place some time ago. According to the Interior Minister, we are once again confronted with the distortion of good information, which represents an unscrupulous politicization of the whole case.

The suggestion supported by the opposition that a civil war will break out in Macedonia coincided completely with statements made by the leaders of some neighboring countries, the ultimate objective being to proclaim Macedonia a hotbed of crisis. It meant, Frckovski said, involving Macedonia in the conference on the crisis in former Yugoslavia, where its fate would be discussed at an alien table. The fact was, Frckovski said, and it had been proved by the latest police action, that the government had absolute control over the situation in Macedonia, which took away all the trump cards from the opposition's hands.

[Box, page 3]

The Government "Falls" With at Least 61 Votes

Concerning the procedure for a vote of no confidence in the government, Igor Spirovski, secretary of the Macedonian Parliament said it was a procedure foreseen in Article 92 of the Constitution, in which it is stated that the government and all its members were responsible to parliament, and that it was parliament that voted confidence in the executive body.

As provided by the Constitution, this question can be raised by at least 20 delegates, and the voting takes place three days after the question on confidence has been raised, which, in this case, was yesterday.

In Spirovski's words, the voting must end after the expiration of the third day, and the voting takes place at 2400 hours, but half an hour before (at 2330 hours), the prime minister takes the floor. His address is at exactly this hour, no matter whether the debate in parliament has ended or not. It is true that neither of these things were noted in the Constitution, Spirovski said, but it was just an interpretation based on the experience of other parliamentary systems. The vote of no confidence in the government will pass only if the majority of the number of delegates are in favor; in figures that means that the government "falls" if 61 delegates vote against it.

[Box, page 3]

The State Defense Plan Was Not Broken Through

"I here declare, with utmost responsibility, that so far, there has been no indication that the mobilization scheme of the Macedonian Army has been broken through, nor has it been the case with the defense plan of the Republic of Macedonia," Defense Ministry Vlado Popovski said, in answer to many accusations by those who signed the request for a vote of no confidence in the government. He added that nobody disposed of such documents and that there was no point in creating a feeling of alleged fear. It had to be proven with arguments, the Defense Ministry's top man emphasized. Regarding the question about the alleged uses of quotes in the Macedonian Army, Popovski said it was a case of fabrications in the polemics between one side and another.

He also spoke about some elements in the justification of the request for a vote of no confidence in the government submitted by the VMRO-DPMNE that referred to the Defense Ministry. He said that those were conclusions without any connection with the government domain. It was suggested that there was political activity and a political organization in the Defense Ministry, Popovski said, adding that he would resign if such evidence was presented. He also said that if there is evidence to support rumors that the Macedonian defense system had been penetrated by foreign intelligence structures that would also be a reason for him to resign. The Interior Ministry had carried out a thorough investigation of the case, and in that process no evidence had been found of manipulation of classified documents, or of the leaking of confidential information.

Crvenkovski Addresses Parliament

AU1711145993 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 17 Nov 93 p 3

[Unattributed report: "The Discovered Affair—A Proof of Government Strength"]

[Text] In his half-hour address to the Parliament, Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski gave a detailed explanation about the previous cases of votes of confidence in the government. "Since the formation of the parties coalition government," he emphasized, "the opposition has been making remarks, which, as you know, never came true." The prime minister quoted the arguments stated by the opposition in the previous vote of confidence, on the occasion of the UN admission of Macedonia under its provisional name. "It was then said it was a treason to the state, that the Macedonian people lost their national identity and that the provisional name meant victory for the Greek policy. On the contrary," Crvenkovski underlined, "as we can now see, the admission to the world organization contributed to an accelerated process of Macedonia's recognition. Thus, today some 50 countries in the world have recognized Macedonia. One should not forget it created conditions for the admission of the state to the UN organizations, as well as to other international associations."

According to what Prime Minister Crvenkovski said, the opposition was driving to a conclusion that the government is hushing up the whole case, which was, in his opinion, a construction full of mistakes.

"Namely," Crvenkovski said, "the whole group was not discovered by the opposition or by any others outside the government structures; this operation was performed by this government and its ministers, therefore the speculation about the government's hushing up the case, as you say, is unjustified and it represents a nonsense. Since the submitters of the initiative are aware that such speculation cannot be backed up, another more disputable thesis is now invented, that the Interior Ministry completed its task in a professional and engaged way, but the problem lies in the government because it was alleged to have minimized the case. Therefore, it is presumed that the Interior Ministry is one thing and the government another," the Prime Minister outlined, "or that the Interior Ministry did the whole job independently and without the knowledge of the prime minister, which is, of course, disputable for two reasons. First, it would mean that the Interior Ministry acted in a putschist manner, that it is independent and beyond any political control; and second, it is this same ministry which has been, for so many times up to now in this same Parliament, and by the same opposition, qualified as unprofessional, politically colored, and obedient to the president of the state, to the prime minister, to the SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia], and so on and so forth.

"Macedonia is still in the process of completion of its national and legal subjectivity," the Prime Minister pointed out, and added that "this process has not been definitely completed, and various other temptations and obstacles are possible on that road. A couple of days ago we could hear the address of the new Greek Foreign Minister Papoulias to UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali, from which—if read accurately—adequate conclusions about the future orientation in the activities of our southern neighbor can be drawn."

Crvenkovski then extracted only the part of interest for discussion and quoted some parts from the letter in which it was stated that the premature recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, without previously solving the internal ethnic problems, brought about the civil war and interference of neighboring countries. According to that, this precedent with Bosnia and Herzegovina could be repeated in Skopje, because two ethnic groups are in antagonism in this region and there exists the possibility of a deterioration in their relations.

"The intention of those opposing the international recognition and constitution of the Republic of Macedonia is to complicate the status of our state, to make it look like an inseparable segment of the Yugoslav crisis, in order to force out a solution to its status in a common packet, with an uncertain outcome for us. If that is the goal, then what are the means for that goal?" Crvenkovski asked. "Evidently, the ethnic confrontation and conflict that would take place in Macedonia. What is the necessary reply on our side? Very simple—to safeguard peace, stability, mutual confidence and tolerance, mutual respect and high consideration. That is the winning card.

"Every other alternative is a defeat, an evil for all of us living in this state, for the Macedonians, for the Albanians, for the Turks, and for all the others. I am not conveying these messages to the extremists of any nationality, and it is unfortunate but you all have them. I firmly believe that their ears are too hard to accept these," as Crvenkovski said, "Christian messages."

"Although two of the three points in the justification for the vote of confidence in the government were related to economic subjects and issues, these problems were the least discussed, even though they deserve the greatest attention," the Prime Minister said.

"Finally," he outlined, "there are serious and responsible tasks ahead of us: the completion of the international recognition of Macedonia and its inclusion in the European and international integrations. The territorial integrity and sovereignty of our state must be maintained. We must build up our fatherland as a real democratic state, we must create prerequisites for overcoming the economic crisis and provide for the economic development and progress of our fatherland. These are not and cannot be the goals of only one party, these are general interests of all the political and economic structures, of all the citizens of this state, regardless of their national and political affiliation. If we all unite around these common goals, I believe we shall reach them sooner and safer. The government is ready to

undertake its responsibilities with a firm will and promptness to succeed, or like it was said on several occasions —if something has to be done, then it has already been done. The efforts and the sufferings, even the impossibilities, do not matter," Branko Crvenkovski said at the end of his address.

Aid Convoy Leaves Skopje for Sarajevo

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[Text] Belgrade, 18 Nov (TANJUG)—Miso Klacar, secretary of the consulate of the Belgrade-based Children's Embassy, told TANJUG today that a convoy made up of 20 trucks transporting food and one tanker transporting gasoline left Skopje for Sarajevo this morning. The convoy is travelling via Belgrade.

He stressed that this is the first convoy that has been organized on the basis of UN permission for the Children's Embassy to take into Yugoslavia 9,000 tonnes of food to the value of 9 million German marks; the next one should leave next week.

The Belgrade consulate expects the convoy to arrive in Belgrade between 1700 and 1900 this evening. The convoy is to continue its journey to Sarajevo via Zvornik tomorrow morning.

Kosovo

Albanian Migrants Return From Western Europe

AU1711181593 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian 16 Nov 93 p 2

[Article by Z. Bekolli: "Public Statements Must Be Based on Evidence"]

[Text] Our public is often thrown into confusion by statements, interviews, etc. that are not only based on no evidence, but often contradict each other.

Such cases are unfortunately common, and involve fixed attitudes. For instance, there is an observable tendency to bring before the public a morass of data about the number of Albanians that have emigrated in recent years.

One side insists that 250,000 Albanians have turned their backs on the Republic of Kosova in the last three years, driven out by the Serbian police repression, while figures twice as high are often floated in public. However, no concrete evidence is given for these figures, and indeed no such evidence exists, since no political group or association possesses exact figures because of the fast rate of the phenomenon. Departures, but also arrivals, are so frequent that it is difficult to keep accurate records of this phenomenon. Why, therefore, all this haste to thrust upon the public figures that have no evidence behind them, or, rather, whom does this haste serve? Although movements of Albanians toward the West and the Scandinavian countries have been recorded in the last three years, we have been faced in recent months with the phenomenon of people returning from many European countries, and especially from Sweden, where there are thought to be 40,000-50,000 Albanian refugees. Albanian individuals and families are being systematically returned from Sweden, while Norway, which has many fewer Albanian refugees, is behaving similarly. Unofficial sources report that the Norwegian Government has decided to deport even those Albanian refugees who are most determined to remain in Norway, about 350 individuals and families who have taken shelter in the country's churches. There are also cases of people returning from other countries such as Switzerland and sometimes Germany. One only has to visit our schools to realize how many pupils and teachers have returned to their school desks and jobs. One would doubtless gain the same impression by visiting villages and towns. It would therefore be better for our parties and association to undertake the registration of returning individuals, families, young people, and children, instead of standing by and spreading alarming figures among the public. Because of this, it would be more proper for us to use evidence when we mention figures, and not to obscure the truth, because public statements carry their own weight.

In the last five or six months alone, parties, associations, and individual historians and academics have at various meetings put forward so many figures from different periods, that it has become hard to tell which, if any, are accurate. When they talk about a particular period or such a phenomenon as Albanian emigration, historians, demographers, and academies should use persuasive arguments and cite evidence. This is what is done throughout the world, and this is the way of ascertaining the truth and creating trust in all those who strive toward the truth. However, in our case the figure of 500,000 Albanians is put forward in public, without evidence, and without stating over what period of time. It is not the same to state that 250,000 Albanians have left the republic of Kosova in the last three years (without counting those who have returned and are returning) as to state that 500,000 Albanians have emigrated. Because of the lack of evidence, it is uncertain whether the latter figure relates to the period since World War I or whether it covers all the ethnic Albanian territories. If it covers all the ethnic Albanian territories since World War I, this is a totally different business. This is why we should be careful in our public statements and should not hesitate to protest data offered without evidence, because in this way we will encourage a cultured use of the mass media and increase our sense of responsibility in what we tell the public.